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THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

A Quarterly Journal of Philosophy

Vol. XXIV NOVEMBER, 1946 No. 1

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL
HENRI RENARD, S.J.

THE MARCH TOWARD MATTER
JOHN MacPARTLAND

24
1946-47

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CLIFFORD G. KOSSEL, S.J.

THE MUTABILITY-IMMUTABILITY PRINCIPLE IN ST. AUGUSTINE'S METAPHYSICS
BERNARD COOKE, S.J.

BOOK NOTICES

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THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL

The philosophy of St. Thomas is existential. This fact is quite manifest in his metaphysics of cognition. It is the purpose of this article to present St. Thomas's existential theory of knowledge in a simple, almost elementary manner, emphasizing the extreme importance of the to-be.

The problem of knowledge is a problem of the to-be, and the reason is that the to-know is a resultant of a certain mode of to-be. Aristotle says that the soul somehow can become all things, meaning that the soul can know all things, because it is what it is. For "to know is to be in a new and fuller manner."[1]

To know is the act or perfection of a perfect being (*actus perfecti*). It supposes that the knowing subject is in act in order to act the act of knowledge. "This kind of an action," (to feel and to understand) remarks St. Thomas, "is an act of the perfect, that is to say, of what is in act."[2]

GENERAL IDEA OF KNOWLEDGE

The most general idea of knowledge is that of the extension of a being, or rather of the to-be of the knower, beyond itself. In order to know, one must somehow *become* another; for to know is to be another. It is a sort of participation in the to-be of another, not inasmuch as this other, the object, is an individual, existing distinct and separate from the knowing subject, but inasmuch as the subject by knowing becomes in the intentional order and lives the idea, the reality, which is the object.

There is then this vast difference between knowing and non-knowing beings: "The latter possess only their own form; whereas the

[1]Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Thomas*, p. 262.

[2]*ST*, I, 18. 3. All the translations from the *Summa Theologica* and the *Summa contra Gentiles* are based, with the publisher's permission, on that of Pegis, *Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York: Random House, 1945).

knowing being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing, for the species of the thing known is in the knower. Hence it is manifest that the nature of a non-knowing being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of knowing beings has greater amplitude and extension. That is why the Philosopher says that the soul is in a sense all things."[3]

But what is there in the nature of the knower that makes it capable of this dilation which we call knowing? The answer given by St. Thomas is of the greatest importance. This mode of existence which we call knowledge is due entirely to immateriality—to the spirituality of the subject, that is to say, to its freedom from matter. For it is matter which restricts a being by limiting its form and preventing it from being anything else except what it is. Hence it is obvious that the perfection of the act of knowledge is proportionate to the knower's independence of matter.

"The contraction of the form comes through the matter. According, then, as they are the more immaterial, forms approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore, it is clear that the mode of immateriality is the mode of cognition. Hence plants do not know because of their materiality. But sense is cognitive because it can receive species from matter. Since therefore God is in the highest degree of immateriality, it follows that he occupies the highest place in knowledge."[4]

"There is then a considerable gap between that which is never anything but itself, and that whose being is on the contrary capable of dilating and taking up within itself the being of other things; *this is precisely the gap which separates the MATERIAL from the SPIRITUAL.*"[5] And, in the last analysis, this gap is founded on the difference between the material and the immaterial to-be. If the to-be is material in a complete sense, that is, if it depends absolutely and entirely upon matter, the being can only be what it is; it can never become another; it can never know. If on the contrary the to-be is immaterial, and therefore not buried in matter, the being is not only what it is, but can somehow be other things.[6]

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[3] *Ibid.*, 14. 1.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

[6] "Est autem differentia inter utrumque *esse:* quia secundum esse materiale, quod est per materiam contractum, unaquaeque res *est hoc solum quod est*, sicut hic lapis, non est aliud quam hic lapis: secundum vero esse immateriale, quod est amplum, et quodammodo infinitum, in quantum non est per materiam terminatum, res non solum est id quod est, sed etiam *est quodammodo alia*" (*In II de Anima*, 5).

"We must conclude, therefore, that the material things known [by the intellect of man] must needs exist in the knower not materially, but rather immaterially. The reason for this is that the act of knowledge extends to things outside the knower; for we know even the things that are outside us. Now by matter the form of a thing is determined to some one thing. Therefore it is clear that knowledge is in inverse ratio to materiality. Consequently, things that are not receptive of forms, save materially, have no power of knowledge whatever—such as plants . . . But the more immaterially

After this explanation, we can formulate the problem of knowledge thus: What does this "to be another" or "to become another" really mean? How can a being, an immaterial being, remain what it is and become another at the same time? Or to put it more concretely: What is this process of knowing in which the knower becomes the known?

IMMATERIAL UNION

The answer is not far to seek. Knowledge is a *union*, an immaterial or *intentional* union, between the knowing subject and the known object. "The noblest way of possessing a thing is *to possess it in an immaterial manner*, that is, by possessing its form without its matter; and *this is the definition of knowledge.*"[7] In other words knowledge is the immaterial union of the knower and the thing known. This being so, it is readily seen that the act of knowing is absolutely perfect when the immaterial union is perfect—that is, when the object known as well as the knowing subject are pure act, and hence pure immateriality. For in that event, the subject *is* perfectly one with the object. This most perfect act of knowledge we shall find only in God who is in the highest degree of spirituality since he is his own to-be. In him the most perfect possible union is had in that ineffable Conception through which God contemplates his essence; the Conception, or Word, which is identical with the divine essence.[8]

Now, because the perfection of this union depends on the degree of immateriality of subject and object, and, moreover, because in the actual union the object must share in the mode of existence of the subject, we may say that the perfection of the act of knowledge is proportioned to that of the to-be of the knower. This will clearly appear if we compare four types of knowledge: the knowledge of God, of angels, the intellectual knowledge of man, and the sense knowledge of man and of the brute animal.

God's knowledge, as was stated above, is perfect because he is his own to-be, and consequently the act of knowledge in God is identical with existence which is his essence. "God alone, therefore, understands all things *through his essence;* but neither the human soul nor the angels can do so."[9]

Angelic knowledge is necessarily less perfect than God's. The reason is obvious. In an angel the essence is distinct from the to-be

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a being receives the form of a thing known, the more perfect is the knowledge" (*ST*, I, 84. 2).

[7] *In Librum de Causis*, 8.

[8] "It is clear that the more a thing is understood, the more closely is the intellectual conception joined and united to the one understanding (*magis intima intelligenti*); since *the intellect by the very act of understanding is made one with the object understood.* Hence as the divine understanding is the very supreme perfection of God, the divine Word is of necessity *perfectly one* with the source whence He proceeds, without any diversity" (*ST*, I, 27. 1 ad 2).

[9] *Ibid.*, 84. 2c.

and limits it. Consequently no act of knowledge in an angel, not even the knowing of his own essence, can be so perfectly united with that essence as to be identical with it.[10] Thus, even angelic knowledge, although far superior to human knowledge, is limited and imperfect precisely because of the distinction between essence and to-be.

It is true, of course, that since the essence of an angel is a pure form, the problem of matter does not enter into the question of angelic knowledge. With regard to man, however, this problem is all important. Man is a rational animal, composed of a spiritual soul and a body. Accordingly, his mode of being is partly material; and hence his knowledge is far less perfect than that of an angel. For although he possesses an intellect made to know the intimate reality of substances, he has to contact corporeal objects by his senses. Moreover, the proper and proportionate object of man's intellect—which is the essence of material things—is intelligible in potency only, since it is profoundly buried in matter. Consequently its intelligibility must be rendered actual by an abstraction from matter. It stands to reason that in the act of knowledge which follows such an abstraction, only a relatively imperfect union between subject and object can be established.

Finally, with regard to sense knowledge, since a sense faculty is partly material—that is, intrinsically dependent upon matter—and since the objects of sense cognition are the sensible manifestations of reality—namely, the appearances of things—it cannot be expected that in cognition of this kind the union between subject and object can be anything but weak and ephemeral.[11]

From all this we conclude that the degree of perfection of knowledge varies according to the mode of existence of the knower. The concept of knowledge, therefore, which we predicate of diverse natures must be *an analogous concept;* and its analogy, depending as it does on the nature of the to-be, is an analogy of proportionality.

Every type of union demands some kind of compatibility, some similarity between its components. Contraries cannot be members of the same unit. Hence, in order that the union requisite for knowledge be possible, in order that the object be one with the knower, the object, like the subject, must necessarily be somewhat immaterial. This is so because, as we have explained, matter is the greatest obstacle to knowledge. But at once a question arises concerning both the object of the human intellect, the material essence, and the object

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[10]We do not deny that no distinct intelligible species is required in order that an angel may know its own essence.

[11]"The more immaterially a being receives the form of the thing known, the more perfect is its knowledge. Therefore the intellect, which abstracts the species not only from matter, but also from the individuating conditions of matter, knows more perfectly than the senses, which receive the form known without matter indeed, but subject to material conditions" (*Ibid.*).

of sense cognition, the material appearances of things. How can such corporeal objects become constitutive factors in a union which must be strictly immaterial?

"The known material things," explains St. Thomas, "must exist in the knower not materially, but rather immaterially."[12] When a material object is known it is received in the knower; and in this process it must undergo a transformation, a sort of sublimation and spiritualization, so that the union with the knower may be effected. The reason is that if it were received with its individual matter which limits it to be this individual, it could never actuate another individual; and no other being could become it. Such sublimation, however, would not be possible, if in spite of being seemingly immersed in matter this material being did not possess a faint vestige of the immaterial.

In the first place we must say that all beings, even those on the lowest rung of the scale of reality, participate in immateriality. The reason is that all beings, precisely because they are beings, in order to exist must participate in the Being that is the act of existence and therefore pure immateriality. Consequently, no matter how weak this participation is, no matter how deeply immersed in matter the form may be, there remains a vestige of that which it shares, of that which makes it real, which makes it *be*.

Moreover, if we look at these corporeal objects from the point of view of knowledge, we must also say that all beings are at least fundamentally immaterial, since they are known to God. Indeed they are first and last an idea in the mind of God, since "whatever exists is the effect of God's knowledge."[13] Their knowableness, therefore, comes from this that the divine intellect contemplating the divine essence sees its imitability in the order of possible beings. This, of course, is merely another way of saying that these beings participate in the divine to-be, because the divine intellect is the divine essence, and that essence is its own act of existence.

If, then, the idea which they share and which therefore is in them somehow, can be extracted from the matter that hides it to our intellect, and if, so to speak, a prolongation of this intelligibility can reach the intellect and be united with it, knowledge will be had. This prolongation is what St. Thomas calls the *species*. By this species, which is a formal representation of the object, man's intellect, which is a potency for knowledge, is actuated to the union of intellection, with the result that the intellect in act is the thing understood in act, and the intentional union which is essential to knowledge becomes a fact.

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[12] *Ibid.*

[13] "Scientia Dei est causa rerum" (*Ibid.*, 14. 8).

As to sense cognition, it is sufficient to say that the object impresses a species in the sense faculty. This species actuates the potency and causes a union which, although not as highly spiritualized as the intellectual union, possesses, nevertheless, a certain degree of immateriality.[14]

It might appear that we are professing some sort of idealism when we say that to know is to become the object. It must be understood, however, that knowledge does not mean that the knower ceases being himself while becoming another. When anyone perceives a mountain, he certainly does not turn into the mountain. If he did, a substantial change would take place. He would cease being himself; and, having become a mountain, he would no longer be capable of knowing anything. John of St. Thomas clearly expresses this fundamental truth in these words: "Beings that are capable of knowing are superior to the non-knowing beings because they can receive in themselves that which is other in its otherness, that is, what remains distinct as another, so that while they remain what they are they can become other beings."[15]

This becoming another without losing one's own individuality may seem an implicit denial of the principle of contradiction. In point of fact, however, there is no such denial here for the simple reason that the one knowing becomes the object in the *order of intention* (the intentional order) while remaining what he is—man—*in the order of nature*. Now the order of intention is the order of the mind, the order of knowledge, and, for man, is the order of immaterial representation. Consequently, to the end that the subject may become the object in the order of intention while remaining itself in the order of nature, it is necessary that the corporeal object be received not *physically*, as it exists in reality, but *intentionally*, that is, by means of an immaterial representation in the subject.[16]

ORDER OF INTENTION

Our present concern is to find out exactly what this order of intention really means when contrasted with the order of nature.

We should note in the first place that in the order of intention, the being of the object received in the knower is not the physical object

[14] "Oportet ut quaelibet cognitio sit per modum formae quae est in cognoscente" (*De Ver.*, 2. 6c).

[15] "Cognoscentia autem in hoc elevantur super non-cognoscentia, quia id quod est alterius ut alterius, seu prout manet distinctum in altero, possunt in se recipere, ita quod in se sunt, sed etiam possunt fieri alia a se." Joannes a Sancto Thoma, "De Anima," in *Philosophia Naturalis*, III, 4. 1.

[16] "We see that the same thing can be found at one and the same time in the world of nature where it exists, and, when it is known, in the world of the soul or of thought; and it is necessary for us to distinguish the thing as thing, existing or able to exist by itself, and the thing as object, set before the faculty of knowing and made present to it." Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge* (New York: Scribner, 1938), p. 110.

which exists distinct from the knower, but a form or species[17]—a more or less perfect similitude which is representative not merely of the form of the object but of the whole object. This species, this similitude, is called the object in the intentional order because it is an immaterial representation of the object. This same species, however, when viewed as an accidental form, is a form in the order of nature, and as such it unites itself physically with the operative potency which it actuates.

Now if we consider the union which takes place in the order of nature between this species as an accidental form, and the operative potency which is an accidental form of the subject, we must say that this union is a *physical* union of act and potency. This is so because the species actuates the operative potency, and the resulting composite is neither of its parts but something else, "a third something"—namely, the actuated intellect. If, however, we consider that the form received is the *similitude* of the object by which the subject knows the object, and if, moreover, we consider that both forms—the operative potency and the species—are acts and are immaterial,[18] we must say that the *intentional union* is a peculiar union of act with act, in which the subject becomes the object in the act of knowledge.

We should not imagine that the intentional to-be of the species is a reality distinct from the to-be of nature of the same species. In reality they are one and the same to-be. There is, we may say, one immaterial to-be in which we distinguish two functions: the natural physical union between two immaterial accidental forms and the intentional union or the fact that the formal similitude of an object is received immaterially in an operative potency which is made to know. From this unique mode of union the fact of knowledge necessarily results.

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[17]Exceptions to this distinction are noted in the case of pure spirits (angels) and more so of God, regarding the knowledge of their own essence. The object here is intelligible in itself, immediately present to the subject, and proportioned to its mode of knowledge. At this peak of reality, the order of nature is identical with the order of intention, and therefore no representative species is required. If, however, it were objected that the soul of man which is an immaterial form and therefore intelligible in itself, and immediately present to the knower, man, is not known except by means of very imperfect representative species, the answer as we shall explain later is that this object is not proportioned to the human intellect which has for its proper object material essences.

[18]The subject must be somehow immaterial in order to know. The species, being received in the knower, must also be free from matter according to the degree of immateriality of the subject, since whatever is received must be received according to the nature of the receiver. "The sensible form is in one way in the thing which is external to the soul and in another in the senses, which receive the forms of sensible things without receiving matter, such as the color of gold without receiving gold. So too the intellect, according to its own mode, receives under conditions of immateriality and immobility the species of material and movable bodies; for the received is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver" (*ST*, I, 84. 1c).

It is obvious, then, that unless the being-object is pure intelligibility (God), or unless it is a pure form, immediately present and proportioned to the faculty (an angel's essence as known by the same angel), the corporeal object *will have to be received in the knower as a representative form, a species, by means of which the operative potency will unite itself to the object.* For it is unthinkable that a corporeal individual substance, existing by the to-be of nature, could be received in an immaterial subject, and assimilated by it in an intentional union.

"*The sensible in act is the sense in act, and the intelligible in act is the intellect in act.* For the reason why we actually feel or know a thing is because our intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible or intelligible species."[19] "The forms that are actually understood become one with the intellect actually understanding."[20] "The thing understood is in the knower by its own likeness. It is in this sense that we say that the *thing actually understood is the intellect in act*, because the likeness of the thing understood is the form of the intellect, just as the likeness of a sensible thing is the form of the sense in act. It does not follow that the abstracted intelligible species is what is actually understood; but rather it is the likeness thereof."[21]

These texts indicate the manner in which the knower becomes the object and in what sense the classical phrase "the sensible in act is the sense in act, and the intelligible in act is the intellect in act" must be taken. The intelligible in act, or, as it is also called, the thing understood in act does not signify the species but rather the object as stripped or denuded of the matter which prevented it from being actually understood. It is *because of* and *by means of* the species that the thing itself becomes actually understood. This fact must be carefully noted, for it is of extreme importance. What is actually understood is not the species but the object itself. The phrase "intellect in act" signifies the intellect which has been actuated by the species.

Relative to the text of the *Contra Gentes* which we have just quoted, Sylvester of Ferrara has a lengthy and important commentary. According to the *Commentary on the Sentences*,[22] he says, we should not understand this phrase—"the form actually understood becomes one in act with the intellect"—to mean that the form becomes the very essence, or part of the essence of the possible intellect, but rather that it is a form inhering in the intellect. From the conjunction of these two forms a unit results which we call the intellect in act, just as from the soul and the body a unit (man) results capable of

[19] *Ibid.*, 14. 2.
[20] *CG*, I, 44 arg. 4.
[21] *ST*, I, 85. 2 ad 1.
[22] *In I Sent.*, d. 35, 1. 1 ad 3.

human operations. We do not say that the body becomes the soul or the soul the body. This comparison, of course, is not exact in all particulars but only insofar as in each case a union which is a unit for operation results. With regard to the union of species and intellect, it is a unit which is in act to know. How then can we affirm that because of this union the intellect in act is the thing actually understood? In order to solve this difficulty, we must consider that by the expression "the thing actually understood" we can mean either of two things: 1) the intelligible species, which is said to be understood in act, not because it is that which is first and directly understood but because it is that by which the thing represented is understood; or 2) the very thing, which is represented by the species.

If the first is meant, the expression is not quite correct. The intellect in act is not the species, nor is the species the thing actually understood. Rather the intellect is one with the species, inasmuch as from the union of these two the intellect in act results. And thus species and intellect are one by composition, just as the whole is somehow one with its part, in view of the fact that the part is not altogether extrinsic to the whole.

The second expression is correct; by the "thing actually understood" is meant the known object, not the species. Hence it is true that those two, the intellect in act and the thing actually understood, are one, and that the intellect in knowing becomes the thing. Let us make this clear. The form which is received in the intellect is the same form *according to its intelligible content*[23] as that which is outside the intellect. They differ in the mode of existence. In the order of individual realities, the form has an *esse* of nature, whereas the form received in the intellect has an intelligible to-be.[24] The very nature, therefore, the very perfection of the thing which exists outside of the mind, is received in the intellect.[25] In this sense St. Thomas declares that even a lowly nature, for example a stone, perfects the intellect.

Because, however, everything is what it is by its form and by its nature, it follows that the intellect in act—because it has the form and nature of the thing understood—becomes the thing which is understood.[26] One who understands the stone is a stone in a true sense, just as a subject having the form of a stone is a stone. And yet, since the form of the stone as existing in the intellect has no to-be of nature but only an intelligible to-be, it follows that the intellect which is in

[23]We do not mean, to be sure, the same identical form but one representing not merely the form but the essence of the object.

[24]"The intelligible species is the similitude of the object, and in a certain sense it is the quiddity and nature of the thing not with the to-be of nature, as in things outside, but with an intelligible existence." "Unde species intelligibilis, est similitudo ipsius essentiae rei, et est quodammodo ipsa quidditas et natura rei secundum esse intelligible, non secundum esse naturale, prout est in rebus" (*Quodlibet. VIII*, 2. 4c).

[25]Cf. *De Ver.*, 2. 2.

act because of the form of the stone, cannot be called a stone absolutely but only intelligibly. In brief, it is a stone in the order of knowledge.[27]

The intellect, then, informed by the species of the thing understood is said to be the thing understood, because the intellect has the form of the object by means of which the intellect is in act. For the same reason, the thing understood is the intellect in act, because it is actually understood by the same form which actuates the intellect. This form is the intelligible species existing in the intellect.

As to the nature of this union between intelligible and intellect, we may truly say that a more intimate unit is effected in it than between matter and form. The reason is that a new being—a third something—does not result from this union as it does in the composite which is effected in the union of matter with form. For, as we have explained, when the thing is understood it becomes one with the intellect, so that the intellect *is* in a true sense that which is understood. Matter, on the contrary, does not become form; but from the union of matter and form a third being results. Consequently the unity between the intellect in act and the thing understood in act is more perfect than the unity of a matter and form composite.[28]

THE ACT OF KNOWLEDGE

We have at length arrived at the last step of the process of knowledge, the operation or act of knowledge itself—the to-know. This operation is the immanent act par excellence; it is the act of a perfect being.

We have seen how the faculty, which is primarily a passive potency, is determined and actuated by a definite species. Being thus determined, it is in act and must produce its operation; for every being acts inasmuch as it is in act. Hence the act of knowledge follows.

We may say therefore that knowledge in man does not consist merely in the reception of a representative species. Such a reception is caused by an extrinsic agent and falls under the category of *passion*.

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[26]"Sic enim actu intelligit *res*, cum species rei facta fuerit forma intellectus possibilis. Propter quod dicitur quod intellectus in actu est intellectum in actu" (*Compendium Theologiae*, I, 83).

[27]"Manifestum est etiam quod species intelligibiles, quibus intellectus possibilis fit in actu, non sunt objectum intellectus. Non enim se habent ad intellectum sicut quod intelligitur, sed sicut quo intelligit. Sicut enim species quae est in visu, non est quod videtur sed est quo visus videt; quod autem videtur est color qui est in corpore; similiter quod intellectus intelligit est quidditas, quae est in rebus; non autem species intelligibilis, nisi in quantum intellectus in seipsum reflectitur" (*In III de Anima*, 8. 718).

[28]Cajetan proposes the same conclusion regarding the perfection of the union between knower and known. "The knower is the thing known, either actually or potentially. But matter is never form. And from this difference as to being follows a difference as to unity: namely, that knower and known are more one than matter and form" (*In I Summae Theologicae*, 14. 1).

It is certainly not a strictly immanent action. The impression and reception of a species is not the act of perfect being; it is the actuation of a passive potency. By this reception and actuation the faculty is determined to know this object rather than another. But the act which follows is a strictly immanent operation which somehow terminates in the object and unites the subject with it.

We are now able to give a more comprehensive definition of human knowledge. Knowledge in man is an *immanent operation enacted by an operative potency which has been actuated by a representative species.*

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THE MARCH TOWARD MATTER

Ever since Descartes cut being off from the mind, the mind has been descending by degrees into matter. Perhaps today it has reached its lowest degree of materialization; but it might be this same materialized mind of today that is in a better position than ever before to understand the true nature of the immaterial. These conclusions are at least suggested by considering what we shall call the march toward matter.

Before considering the first step in this *descensus* of the mind toward matter, which comes with the Cartesian break from Aristotelian philosophy, we must understand what the Aristotelian means by immaterial activity. We might contrast it with nutritive assimilation. The plant is composed of parts and therefore has to divide its food into parts and add the parts bit by bit to the parts of its organism. The plant works thus: it takes in CO_2 and H_2O and synthesizes and divides these as expressed by the equation $CO_2 + H_2O = CH_2O + O_2$. Thus its manner of assimilation is divided into two types of activity: division and addition or synthesis. Furthermore, and most important, these two types of activity terminate in a splitting-up process. In other words, division and addition produce new differences; they terminate in a *production of otherness*, externality, the essential characteristic of matter. For the plant produces otherness by dividing its food into parts. Then it adds or synthesizes the parts to itself to produce another novelty, the fruit, which divides itself from the plant to fall to the ground, and then becomes a *new* plant. And the plant itself, eventually decaying, rots, breaks up into the elements of the soil, and becomes food for *other* plants—the well-known cycle of life. In short, nutritive assimilation is split up into two types of activity, division and synthesis, which produce otherness at every turn.

But the intellect is immaterial, which is to say it is not composed of parts. This is demonstrated by the Aristotelians in many ways but especially from the fact that the intellect is both subject and object, beginning and end, of the same act of reflection—for example, self-consciousness. Since its being is not composed of parts, its activity is not split up into types. Immaterial activity, then, does not labor under the necessity of dividing the other into parts or adding them bit by bit to itself. Rather, *the* type of immaterial activity

is a total intussusception of the other, or, as the Aristotelians call it, an *immanent act*. In other words, because the intellect is not composed of parts, it is able to assimilate the other all in one piece. How? By *being* the other, intentionally or immaterially. Immaterial activity, then, is an immanent act by which the intellect identifies itself intentionally with the other.

It would be a very grave error to conceive this immanent act—the type of immaterial activity—after the fashion of addition or division. These both produce that very otherness which prevents the possibility of being the other. By contrast, when the intellect exercises its most perfectly immanent act, when it acts as intellect, it conquers *all* otherness to see within the other the *very* existential act by which all things exist. For all things are the same in this respect that they have conquered non-being. To see things, then, from the point of view of the very existential act by which this conquest is made is necessarily to know in a way that is beyond parts and otherness. This purely speculative and intellectual vision of being from the inside is the science of metaphysics. It does not consider being from the point of view of its particular determinations such as extension or motion. It sees being from the point of view of transcendental act that holds all particular determinations above nothingness and for that reason cannot be limited to any genus. And it is only natural that the transcendental being can be seen by the naturally transcendent principal in man, his intellect. For the intellect has no parts or otherness in its being, we must repeat, and that is precisely why it does not have to live its life as the plant, always outside things, cutting them up and synthesizing the pieces bit by bit.

We have been considering the highest degree of immanent activity, the knowledge of being *qua* being, and it is necessary to point out that this knowledge is abstractive. Our human intellects are joined to a body, and all our knowledge begins with the perception by the senses of this particular man, or this particular piece of chalk; that is, of concrete, physical, extra-mental being. Consequently, before our intellect can see the intelligible, it must be disengaged from the sensible. And once the intelligible is considered apart, it is at first seen only in a very general way. But after this pre-scientific knowledge of the quiddities of material things, each particular science considers apart a particular aspect of things and is free to investigate its own aspect in any way it sees fit; thus physics considers *ens mobile*, and mathematics considers quantitative being. Yet before a thing can be extended or be moved it must first be. It is this first to-be, the very existential act whereby this particular man or this particular piece of chalk exists, that the intellect sees in its terminal act. But with one blow it is easy to destroy this order among our knowledges and make immanent activity and metaphysics impossible. Merely doubt

the validity of the senses and cut off the mind from being. That is what Descartes did, and now the march toward matter begins.

Descartes makes *all* knowledge conform to the type that mathematics gives. Since mathematics considers being under the aspect of quantity, a divisible aspect, the mind now exercises the corresponding type of activity, division. To put it otherwise, after making immanent activity impossible by emptying the mind of being, Descartes fills it with a manner of operation that is analogous to the first type of activity exercised by the plant that juxtaposes the parts of being by division. Let us now consider his view more precisely.

Descartes gives the type of activity which the mind is to exercise in the four precepts of his method. The first precept limits knowledge to clear and distinct ideas, that is, the ideas he cannot doubt. The very nature of this criterion forces the mind to divide, for it must cut off and reject what cannot be seen clearly. In parenthesis we might add that the logical analysts like G. E. Moore build their philosophies in this way. Descartes, for example, accepts the "cogito, ergo sum" as the starting point of his philosophy because, as he says, even in a doubting process he cannot doubt the "I am." He rejects sense knowledge, on the other hand, because the senses sometimes deceive us. In like manner, since the truths of theology do not square with his criterion of clarity, theology is also cut off from our human knowledges and assigned to the realm of faith. By contrast, Aristole says there is more joy in the imperfect and obscure knowledge of things divine than in the most perfect knowledge of things proportioned to our minds.[1] With clarity as the end, the remaining three precepts show more precisely the type of activity by means of which the end is reached. Divide everything up into parts and go from the simple to the complex so that all the parts will be enumerated.

Descartes builds his own philosophy by methodically applying this morseling view of the life of the mind. After separating the mind from being, he separates off all the characteristics from matter except extension, which, as subject matter of geometry, conforms to the end of clarity. When he cannot see clearly how the body, extension, can influence thought, the human person is divided in two, and the self is identified with thought. In short, since the proper activity of the mind is for him division, its result is always an increase in otherness, externality, the essential characteristic of matter. Because of this materialization of the *activity* of the mind, the *position* of the knower also takes on the externality and exclusiveness that is characteristic of matter. He no longer identifies himself with the other by immanent activity but stands apart to divide the other. The status of the knower is changed to that of an "outside spectator" with its conse-

[1]Cf. the excellent discussion by Maritain, *The Dream of Descartes*, pp. 69-70.

quent false problems against which Dewey has so vigorously protested. The mind is divorced from the other: how can its ideas correspond to things? The mind is divorced from the body: how can a bridge be built between them? Neither of these problems arises if the proper activity of the mind is not to divide. From the Aristotelian point of view, ideas are merely the *means* by which we express what the mind sees in its intentional union with the other. There is no problem of correspondence because ideas would not be born unless this vital living the life of the other (which is knowledge) has already taken place. In like manner there is no bridge to build between mind and body because we do not know a *man* in whom they are separated. The first act of mind, in short, is not to divide the other, but to *be* the other.

So much for the first degree of the materialization of the mind. Because the *activity* of the mind has been conceived after the fashion of one of the types of nutritive assimilation, division, two consequences follow. First, metaphysics, the science of being under its own aspect as being, has disappeared, because the activity of the mind treats being only from the point of view of its divisibility or mathematization. Second, the knower is cut off from being and becomes an "outside spectator." In conclusion, externality, otherness, is now the dominant characteristic of being and knowledge.

Whereas mathematics resolves its concepts in "intelligible matter," as the Aristotelians say, or the intellect refers its concepts directly or indirectly to the intuitive imagination, Kant lowered the mind another degree toward matter by restricting the use of the categories to the matter furnished by the sense. "Concepts without intuitions are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind."[2] The mind, in short, synthesizes the empty concepts furnished by the understanding with the unorganized matter furnished by sense, thus producing the phenomenon or object. The categories having been limited to matter in the construction of the phenomenon, the noumenon remains beyond and unknowable. In other words, as far as the noumenon is concerned the mind is an "outside spectator."

Here the activity of the mind is analogous to the second type of activity found in nutritive assimilation, addition or synthesis. Now the mind *joins* two others, forms and matter, to produce another, the phenomenon. Finally, as in nutritive assimilation, the result is otherness, for the thing is cut off from the object produced.

Descartes emptied the mind of vital immanent activity by his methodical doubt, which emptied the mind of being. Instead he filled it with the static type of activity, division, corresponding to its static object, quantity. In opposition to the mathematicians, and no

[2] *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Max Müller, p. 41.

doubt influenced by the fact that he was also a physicist, Kant favored the more dynamic type of activity, addition.[3] However, both operations, to divide and to synthesize, by their very nature result in that production of otherness which prevents the mind from being the other.

Indeed there are many interpretations of Kant; but on the manner of activity and limits of the speculative employment of reason there can hardly be much divergence from the generally accepted view, which is what we have been considering. *All* speculative knowledge—whether metaphysics, physics, or mathematics—is composed of synthetic *a priori* judgments, and none of these sciences know the noumena.

Cut off from being, the mind cannot order its knowledges in a scale, each science having its own aspect of being and being welcome to its own manner of knowing. Instead, *all* knowledge is made to conform to the manner of knowing of the dominant science of the age. Thus the mind is mathematicized with Descartes and physicized with Kant. In short, cut off from being, it falls down through the scale of the sciences.

The next science to rise is biology with Darwin. The *activity* of the mind has been thoroughly dosed with matter, for it has been conceived after both types of nutritive assimilation. The final step is to lower its very *being* into matter, and this step is taken by philosophical evolutionary naturalism. The mind emerges from matter in the service of biological adaptation. It is *derived* from matter, *works* for biological adjustment, and makes no claim to a manner of being or operation that is not intrinsically dependent on matter. This biological conception of the mind is brought to its logical conclusion by Dewey. For just as Descartes began this *descensus* by emptying the mind of being, Dewey terminates it by emptying the mind of speculative knowledge. Indeed the march toward matter is a practical demonstration of the thesis that unless the mind first knows being it does not know.

Dewey and the Aristotelians are *en rapprochement* on two very important theses. The first is Dewey's rejection of the "outside spectator" position of the knower.[4] If our analysis is correct, this spectator position of the knower is the main cause of this *descensus* movement of the mind into matter, since it makes immanent activity impossible. In rejecting it, then, Dewey is thus far breaking from modern philosophy since Descartes and bringing his view into *rapprochement* with Aristotle. Consequently, like the Aristotelians,

[3]Cf. Gilson's chapter, "The Physicism of Kant" in his *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, pp. 223-47.

[4]Cf. my article, "Aristotle and the Spectator Theory of Knowledge," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XLII (May 24, 1945).

he does not separate mind-body, thought-thing. But the life of this *rapprochement* is killed by Dewey's acceptance of the biological conception of the mind. We should point out in passing that this biological conception of the mind is based on the evolutionary hypothesis (not yet proved) of the body of man. However, our objection here is against Dewey's acceptance of an exclusively materialistic view of evolution. Surely there is nothing in evolution that limits new arrivals to physical variations alone. Evolution does not deny the arrival of a species that can act immanently. But whether the evolutionary hypothesis turns out to be proved of man or not, this biological conception of the mind is still a complete misunderstanding of the manner of operation necessary to satisfy man's natural longing to know all reality. For this longing is satisfied by *conquering* otherness—by living the life of the other—which is the very opposite of *producing* otherness in an endless process of material change. Perhaps Randall has done as well as anyone can with the instrumentalist view; but in his reply to Professor Sheldon it is quite evident that he cannot grant to the mind any intrinsic independence either in the manner of being or operation from process, because the laws of matter hold the reins.[5] By contrast, Sheldon accepts process-evolution in the modern sense of increase, novelty, and so on; but he rejects the materialistic interpretation of evolution and welcomes the intrinsic independence of mind in manner of being and operation. Indeed, it is in Sheldon that process is becoming conscious of its limitations and its proper direction.

Instead of the spectator view, Dewey returns the knower to the position of a "participator within the natural and social scene."[6] We say return, because the Aristotelian will agree that this is the correct position of the knower—only he will add that this participation is by physical *and* immanent activity. Indeed, these views will agree that ideas are forces for action and that the power of the idea to project the body into action is no doubt its most important function. But the Aristotelian will add that the idea turns around, so to speak, to become a force for action, because it is also the means by which we intentionally see the nature of the thing to be acted upon. By a further penetration into the nature of things the intellect ascends to a knowledge of the ultimate causes of things and finally to the first cause. This speculative knowledge is again turned around to direct each act to its *final* end. There is no divorce between knowledge and action here, which the Thomists are so often unjustly accused of making, for the speculative ministers to the practical by furnishing it with the intelligible structure of the universe. It is by immanent

[5]J. H. Randall, Jr., "A Note on Mr. Sheldon's Mind," *Journal of Philosophy*, XLIII (April 11, 1946), 209-14.

[6]*Quest for Certainty*, p. 215.

activity, in short that we see *what* we are to act upon and *why* we should do this rather than that. Indeed, then, we agree that the knower is a "participator within the natural and social scene," and by "directed action," as Dewey says. But we do not understand how this thesis can possibly be fulfilled by a conception of the mind which cannot see but is rather used as an instrument to direct, supposedly, the very process which uses it as an instrument.

Indeed Dewey has done a great service to modern philosophy by eliminating this "outside spectator" view and its false problems. Moreover he has posed the problem of knowledge from the point of view of action in such a way that the answer can now be found. Perhaps if he did not classify the Aristotelian as a "spectator" view, he would also be able to see that the answer is not found in physical activity alone but that the immanent life of the mind must also be lived.

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PRINCIPLES OF ST. THOMAS'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE *ESSE* AND *RATIO* OF RELATION

PART I

INTRODUCTION: SCIENCE, SEMANTICS, AND ORDER

The common man has always looked on the philosopher as a somewhat eccentric person. But not till our times have scientists with a psychiatric bent classified philosophers with the mentally ill; that is, they so classify a certain group of philosophers, those, namely, who do not assent to the current identification of metaphysics, logic, mathematics, and semantics.[1] And let not religious folk, theologians, and mystics exult. A fortiori they who accept the "myths" of theism and Christianity are even more seriously ill. In fact, semanticists say, a serious illness has infected practically the whole of our culture; it is the source of most social and private maladjustments, of infantilism and insanity, of race prejudice and wars.

The essence of this illness lies in the discrepancy between the structure of our language and the structure of the universe. Since language is so influential in our thought and action, this discrepancy produces illusion, verbalism, reversal of values, and, especially, disturbances of the natural process (survival order) of our nervous system. It is true, we grant, that poor linguistic habits are the source of much confusion and trouble, and that sound semantic discipline can do much to correct those habits. But the chief question is: What is the structure of the universe and what is the relation of language to that structure?

Prof. Korzybski clearly states that for him the structure of the universe is represented by the quantum theory which, he says, is all we know about the universe now.[2] He is thus in agreement with the trend of contemporary "realism" and the ascendancy of postulational logic, whose accepted norm is current physico-mathematical

[1] Cf. Alfred Korzybski, *Science and Sanity* (2d ed.; Lancaster, Penn.: The Science Press Printing Co., 1941), p. vii and *passim*. Few scientists or semanticists are as outspoken as Professor Korzybski, but through many there runs the same undercurrent of antagonism and doubt as to the mental balance of "philosophers"; in the works, for instance, of Eddington and Jeans. The scientific aspect of semantics is expounded in most of Carnap's writings. For more popular treatments cf. Stuart Chase, *The Tyranny of Words* (New York: Harcourt, 1938); Irving J. Lee, *Language Habits in Human Affairs* (New York: Harper, 1941).

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 134-35, 154.

theory. This is nothing new. Scientific theorists, ridden by mathematics and the phenomenalism of Hume and Kant, have long considered statistics derived from pointer readings as the limits of human knowledge. That is the meaning of their theories of extensional and inductive logic, expanding concepts, calculus of probabilities, etc., which they are attempting to extend to the social sciences to attain the desired goal of Comte.

What are the chief features of the universe yielded by this method? Scientists recognize that pointer readings are not the things they point to and that statistics do not describe things but certain relations among things. Yet statistics are all we know; absolute terms are unattainable. In practice, therefore, they provisionally accept one designated aggregate of relations, which "common sense" usually considers a "thing"—e. g., an atom, a man, or a star—as a term of further relations. Then, by investigating the relations, they gradually break down or build up to smaller or larger terms in the microscopic and macroscopic worlds, leaving the postulated but unknown substratum to logical construction *a la* Russell.[3] By this method they have discovered the four dimensional world of space-time in which the observer must take his place subject to the same relativity as the observed. This leaves no place for an impartial, absolute observer who would require an absolute space, time, and simultaneity. Finally, they have found interaction among all the observed portions of the universe and have been able to apply the same statistical formulas or functions to its various levels. And this is one of the principal features of their universe; it is structural, ordered, relational—the deflection of an atom affects the shining of the stars.

The new science ousts, at least as ultimate norms, Newtonian and Euclidian views which were based on absolute space and time. The recognition of this would rid us of one bad language tradition. But semanticists find the root of our difficulty much deeper. It lies in Aristotelianism which has dominated scientific conceptions until recently and still dominates the views of the non-scientist about the universe. And Aristotle is at the source of that disastrous discrepancy between language and things. More exactly the accusation is this: Aristotle accepted a primitive subject-predicate language and then, with great rigor and plausibility, drew out the subject-predicate logic and substance-attribute ontology which were implicit in that language. Today we have discarded his view of the universe because science has found it false, but we have not discarded the language structure which implicitly leads to that view. Hence our language generates illusions about the universe, and, when we meet real situations which do not fit into our illusions or which we try to force un-

[3]Cf. *The Modern Schoolman*, XXIII (January, 1946), 77-79.

naturally into them, the illusions generate neuropsychic disorders with their accompanying social ills.

We may pass over here the question of the genesis of Aristotle's scientific method. We ask why his language is considered irreconcilable with a structural universe. The semantic answer is that a subject-predicate language is incapable of representing properly asymmetrical (irreversible) relations such as before and after, whole and part, father and son, etc. But transitive, asymmetrical relations are the only ones that give rise to the serial order demanded by the scientific universe. A predicate always indicates a property of the subject; but, they say, asymmetrical relations cannot be merely properties of subjects. A symmetrical relation such as "equality" might plausibly be viewed as the possession of the same properties by two subjects; "inequality" might likewise be viewed as the possession of different properties. But since these relations are reversible they do not establish a definite order. However, if we analyse "inequality" we shall find an asymmetrical relation involved. For if A is unequal to B, then either A is greater than B or B is greater than A. Now the relation is irreversible and we have order; if a third unequal term is added, we have a serial order.

This is the heart of their objection, but for evidence they note many indications of the anti-structural tendency of the subject-predicate language. For instance, its constant use of substantive words instead of leading to structure leads to elementalism, the attitude of treating parts as entities independent of their relation to the organism—or the universe-as-a-whole. Thus we have such dichotomies as mind and matter, sense and intellect, space and time, etc., with the many false evaluations based on them in medicine and psychology.[4]

Again, according to the new science, there are no identities in the universe; there are only absolute differences of unique but interrelated individuals. But the subject-predicate logic inevitably leads to identifications. When, for instance, we say, "The grass is green," *is* is taken as a sign of at least partial identity; we think of *green* as a part of the grass. But *green* is simply a low order protoplasmic abstraction. And *is* merely represents a relation between the observer and something outside his skin called *grass*. To be exact—that is, scientific—the relation should be dated, for what is green at noon may be purple at sunset.

Then there is the danger of identifying words with things, which is at the origin, for instance, of race prejudice. Things are characterized on the unspeakable objective level by uniqueness and difference.

[4]Professor Korzybski's reduction of the human organism-as-a-whole to the nervous system seems a good example of elementalism. It might also be suggested that his description of elementalism involves some confusion of Aristotle with Descartes.

But owing to the specificity of protoplasm and, therefore, of our reaction to stimuli, we do not get the "all" of these unique individuals; we get merely an accumulation of parts with relations among them. This produces "blurred differences" which we call "similarities." In a higher order of abstraction we fictionalize these similarities by a substantive word such as *man*, *animal*, *Jew*. That is, we may symbolize a class of individuals, with certain relations and "blurred differences" among them, by the word *Jews*, which does not indicate their real character of uniqueness. Hence the term *Jew* by itself is simply a meaningless variable, and the statement "Jews are bad," a propositional function which is neither true nor false till we substitute determined values such as Jew_1, Jew_2, etc. But if I identify the word *Jew* with a thing, and am injured by Jew_1, I immediately hate all Jews, that is, Jew_n—which, of course, is alike absurd and disastrous on the objective level.

Finally, there is danger of a false-to-facts concept of self-identity. The same John Smith does not live for forty or a hundred years. There is only $Smith_1$, $Smith_2$, etc., the subscripts here representing dates. And if we are not conscious of this in our thought and action we shall make more false evaluations. For instance, I may say, "Smith is my enemy"—a propositional function. This may be true of $Smith_1$, April 2, 1946, and false of $Smith_2$, June 2, 1946. In short, there can be no absolute judgment about anything. Heraclitus said that I cannot step into the same stream twice; Professor Korzybski says that the same *I* cannot even step twice, for the universe of unique individuals[5] is moving in the irreversible current of space-time; events do not recur.

As might be suspected, Professor Korzybski proposes the language of mathematics as the cure. Semantically it is called the "map theory" because by exhibiting exact relations it reveals the structure of the universe. Logically it is practically identical with a mathematical or symbolic logic like that of Russell and Tarski, but with emphasis on the neural basis.

Now there is no questioning the methodological value of scientists' procedure in gaining organized control of nature and establishing predictability, which is their sole aim.[6] Nor do we question their accomplishment in revealing much of one genuine type of structure in our mysterious universe. But we deny the exclusiveness of their epistemological theory and their consequent exclusive view of things

[5]What individuals are is not clear, although he states that the electron is the known unit of the world (*op. cit.*, p. 162). It would perhaps be correct to call his "individuals" space-time atoms or events. There is really no constant individual; each cross-section of space and time is a new individual.

[6]For a college textbook on the subject cf. Robert Lindsay and Henry Margenau, *Foundations of Physics* (New York: Wiley, 1936; second printing, 1944), especially the first chapter, "The Meaning of Physical Theory."

which holds that mathematical structure alone reveals the knowable depths of the universe. This has planted in human souls a terrible seed of scepticism which has flowered in more private and social ills than any merely linguistic difficulties, which are at least corrigible without a complete reeducation.

Their principal error is, of course, the denial of intelligence, the *intus legere* of the Scholastics. Between verbal or written symbols and things they admit no medium except a sensitive nervous system (sometimes) and what we may call a systematizing power. St. Thomas had distinguished within the intellect a power of seeing principles (in concept or judgment), that is, of seeing natures which exist in their own act of existing, and a power, in virtue of these principles, of reasoning, that is, of ordering those principles in such a way that the intellect can see in the union of two or more principles what it could not see in any one separately. The scientists' systematizing faculty is like the second power without the first. It does not begin with principles seen by the intellect and end with the intellect seeing principles in conclusions; it begins with postulates and ends with coherent hypotheses turned out to order.

The semanticists follow this in holding that the structure of language must immediately represent the structure of things, that is, the hypothetical structure elaborated by this systematizing faculty. St. Thomas says that words signify things *mediante intellectu*, and this intellectual understanding of things and their being enters into every judgment giving their proper meaning to the terms. Of course, what it sees are the characters of sensibly presented things, but these characters are different from the sense data themselves. And the attainment of these two types of data does not represent two acts of the man-as-a-whole, but one; by the synergy of sense and intellect he knows.

My purpose is not to refute scientific epistemological principles nor to demonstrate the indemonstrable: such as that things exist; that man has sense and intelligence; and that by sense and intelligence he knows things. Neither is it to refute the semanticist view of the universe which, within limits, is true. It is to clarify an alternative and deeper view of the universe, St. Thomas's theory of order. He found the subject-predicate language satisfactory if not entirely adequate (for no language will ever be entirely adequate to express being); and he was even more tenacious of order than the moderns.

ST. THOMAS AND ORDER

The perfection of the universe, says St. Thomas, lies in its order, which is twofold: the order of the parts to one another and the order of the whole to God, its extrinsic principle and good. There are many ways of approaching his view of order, but none seems more fruitful than a study of that character of being, namely, relation, which yields

order.[7] Not only is there disagreement among Scholastic factions on the character of relation, but the great commentators on St. Thomas seem confusingly at odds.[8] St. Thomas himself appears serenely untroubled by many questions which greatly troubled these commentators. Perhaps he overlooked some questions that should be asked even within his own theory; but it is also possible that he had a different view of metaphysical and epistemological principles which made those questions needless.

Like most medievals, St. Thomas first met the problem of relation in theology, in the explanation of the revealed truth that there are three Persons in the one God and of the authoritative tradition, summarized by St. Augustine and Boethius,[9] that the unity of God is in substance and the distinction of Persons in relations. This required a most exacting study of the notions of person and substance as well as that of relation,[10] and placed a severe strain on the Aristotelian logic in which the medievals were nurtured.

AN OPPONENT: GILBERT OF PORREE

Among his opponents in this matter St. Thomas gives the greatest prominence to the Porretani, a school of theologians stemming from Gilbert, Bishop of Poitiers.[11] Relations, they say, are not intrinsic to the subject of which they are predicated but somehow stand outside it (*assistentes, exterius affixae*). St. Thomas uses this as an important element in his own theory but denies its adequacy. Although he gives no lengthy exposition of the philosophy behind this view, he recognized its Platonic parentage.[12] Gilbert, therefore, stands in a

[7] *De Pot.*, 7. 10 and 1. 2 ad 1. For Aristotle's often quoted comparison of the universe to an army cf. *Metaphysics* xii. 10 and St. Thomas's commentary on the same. Cf. also *CG*, III, 69; *In II Sent.*, d. 1, 1. 4.

[8] For a conspectus of some of their differences cf. A. Maltha, "De divisione relationum consideratio," *Angelicum*, XIV (1937), 61-68, and N. Balthasar, "La Réalité de la rélation fini d'après saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue néo-scolastique de philosophie*, 1929, 397.

[9] Augustine, *De Trinitate*, V, 2 (*PL*, XLII, 42, 913 ff.) and *passim*. Boethius, *De Trinitate*, 6 (*PL*, LXIV, 1255a).

[10] For a study of the co-ordinate development of these three notions cf. M. Bergeron, "La structure du concept latine de personne," *Etudes d'historie littéraire et doctrinale du XIIIe siècle*, deuxième serie (Ottawa: Institute d'Etudes Médiévales, 1932), pp. 121-62.

For a brief history of the development of the dogma of the Trinity cf. M. J. Scheeben, *Le Dogmatique* (Paris: Palini, 1880), III, 554 ff.

[11] Cf. *In I Sent.*, d. 26, 2. 1; d. 33, 1. 2; *De Pot.*, 7. 8; 8. 2; *ST*, I, 28. 2. On Gilbert cf. Bergeron, *art. cit.*, 141-47; A. Hayen, "Le Concile de Reims et l'erreur théologique de Gilbert de la Porée," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, X-XI (1935-36), 29-102. On the Porretain school cf. M. Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode* (Freiburg, 1911), II, 430-38; B. Geyer, "Die Sententiae Divinitatis," *B G P M*, VII, 2-3; M. H. Vicaire, O. P., "Les Porretains et l'Avicennisme avant 1215," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, XXVII (1937), p. 449.

[12] Cf. *De Ver.*, 21. 4. St. Thomas does not appear to have read the works of Gilbert, but the latter's views on the Trinity were well known.

ng and distinguished line of opponents to some of St. Thomas's sic philosophical positions.

Gilbert develops his theory in his commentaries on the works of Boethius, where he found ample suggestion. Boethius had said: "Diversum est esse et id quod est."[13] Gilbert explains it thus: that by which a thing is, its *esse* or subsistence (*quo est, subsistentia*), is different from that in which it is, the subsistent (*quod est, subsistens*). From the examples he gives it is clear that the subsistence is the correlative of the abstract term and the subsistent of the concrete term, as e.g., humanity is different from man and corporality from body.[14] This distinction is universal, applying even to God, where divinity is different from God.[15] However, the union of a single subsistence and a single subsistent is not a composition.[16] Hence God, the ideal forms, and primordial matter are simple beings.

Before seeing the composition of things we must define another distinction, that between to be (*esse*) and to be something (*esse aliquid*). As far as natural philosophy is concerned things *are* by their subsistences and *are something* by other forms which accompany the subsistence, that is, measures and qualities.[17] Now a thing may be composed of two subsistents distinct from one another and from the composite; man is composed of body and spirit. Secondly, a single subsistent may be composed of many subsistences by which it *is* plus the many accidents by which it *is something*.[18] We ask then: If a man is a body by corporality, a man by humanity, a spirit by spirituality, etc., what makes the being and unity of a man? This is the ancient problem of participation. How do forms contribute to the being of sensible things, and how can there be a communion of forms without loss of identity?

Gilbert admits a set of forms like the Platonic ideas, which are distinct from God and separate from matter and which function solely as the exemplars of sensible things. But the subsistences are forms in sensible things, and they are put there by creation. Moreover, since for the natural philosopher form is *esse*, these subsistences do not participate in being; they are pure, imparticipated being, through whose presence the subsistent participates in being. However, these forms are intrinsically in no way different from the

[13] *Quomodo Substantiae* (*PL*, LXIV, 1311b).

[14] *In Quomodo Substantiae* (*PL*, LXIV, 1318c); *In de Trinitate* (*PL*, LXIV, 1278d).

[15] *In Quomodo Substantiae* (*PL*, LXIV, 1321a); *In de Trin.* (*PL*, LXIV, 1273c).

[16] *In Quomodo Substantiae* (*PL*, LXIV, 1321b); *In Librum de Duabus Naturis* (*PL*, LXIV, 1381b).

[17] *In Quomodo Substantiae* (*PL*, LXIV, 1318a-b). In the same place he explains that in theology *esse* is the divine essence which we predicate of God when we say that God *is*. Hence if we say that a man or a body *is*, this is by an extrinsic denomination from the essence of their principle, God. For theologians the subsistence, as humanity, is not *esse* but *esse aliquid*.

[18] *Ibid.* (col. 1321a).

exemplars; each is a separate and distinct unit. How, then, can several of them, while preserving their distinctness, communicate in such a way as to unify the single subsistent in which they are present?

Gilbert answers this by attributing to them a causality which is at once formal and efficient. That is, first, they are in the material subsistent, forming it and making it to be. Secondly, each subsistence in the substantial order is a cause of certain proper accidents in the subsistent. As a form the subsistence cannot be the subject of accidents, but its efficacy renders the subsistent a subject of accidents. Thus a body is by corporality and is something by its accidents; e.g., it is colored by color and shaped by shape. But, he says, corporality does not follow on color and shape; rather they follow on corporality which contains some emanative power of producing them in the subject.[19] Finally he establishes an order even among the substantial subsistences so that one somehow flows from and is subject to another. It is the highest of these which is *simpliciter* the *esse* of the thing and the source of its unity.[20]

On this basis he now makes a sharp division of the categories. Substance, quantity, and quality are such that they are in the thing of which they are predicated; they really make it *be* or *be something;* they have the true character of being (*vera ratio essendi*). But, with Boethius, he says that the other seven categories are not predicated in this way either of God or of other things. If we say that a man is in the forum, we do not signify a character of being in the man himself; that is, we signify no inherent form as we do when we say that he is white or tall. These seven categories, while presupposing the being and certain properties of the subject, are made by a comparison with something outside it and merely describe its surroundings.[21]

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[19] *Ibid.* (col. 1318d—1319a); *In Lib. de Duab. Nat.* (*PL*, LXIV, 1360b); *In de Trin.* (*PL*, LXIV, 1281d and 1273d—1274a). In the latter text he refers to mathematical abstraction. Its objects are those forms which cannot be separated actually from matter but may be in thought. These are the subsistences of which Muller-Thym correctly remarks: ". . . in the very eminence of formal being which enables them to be called *subsistentia*, though able to be known by an abstractive effort of the reason, they have a certain universality in themselves" (*The Establishment of the University of Being in Meister Eckart of Hocheim* [New York: Sheed, 1939], p. 57).

He distinguishes *creatio* from *concretio:* "Creatio namque subsistentiam inesse facit, ut id cui inest, ab ea aliquid sit. [This is the theological view.] Concretio vero eidem subsistentia naturas posterioris rationis accomodat, ut id cui cum illa insunt, simplex non sint" (*In de Trin.* [*PL*, LXIV, 1274b]). That is why he says that accidents are present to (*adsunt*) the subsistences, and the subsistences to one another, but they are in (*insunt*) the subsistents (*Ibid.* [col. 1283b, 1291c, and *passim*]).

[20] *In Quomodo Substantiae* (*PL*, LXIV, 1321c); *In de Trin.* (*PL*, LXIV, 1270a—1273b), where he discusses the relations between the parts and the whole in man. Muller-Thym shows that the highest subsistence in the case of man is the specific difference, rational nature (*Op. cit.*, pp. 54-67). Cf. also *In Lib. de Duab. Nat.* (*PL*, LXIV, 1366-67).

[21] *In de Trin.* (*PL*, LXIV, 1284b—1286a, 1290c—1291b). The nominalism of the Stoics had led them to reduce the categories to four in which relation covered Aristotle's last six. Cf. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik* (Leipzig, 1927), I, 426-37.

Relation obviously consists of such an external connection and therefore cannot be inherent. If you take away the servant you have already removed the master, for the *esse* of a master is to have a servant. Neither can you say that the power of coercion is intrinsic to the master as his whiteness is; for this power too demands the presence of a subject. Likewise a man or an animal is not intrinsically right or left; these designations depend entirely on the way I approach him.[22] Like Boethius, he concludes that relative predication neither adds to, diminishes, nor changes its subject in any way. Relation does not consist in being, but simply in the comparison of one thing with another.[23]

This philosophy has been described well as a realism of the understanding,[24] that is, a realism in which each real object of conceptual thought is viewed as a distinct and separate form. The order of forms, which makes their unity, is parallel to the structural order of conceptual thought; the abstract is thought as the principle of the concrete; so it must be in nature. The individual, then, is an ordered collection of forms, but unlike the "individual" of the modern idealists, for whom knowledge which relates is identical with reality, it is not rendered unique by relations, but by the unique collection of its inherent properties, past, present, and future, which does not recur.[25]

Gilbert as a realist could find no local habitation for relation. As a conceptual object it is one; yet it implies two subjects both in concept and predication. But a form cannot be in two subjects, and an accidental form cannot hover in mid-air with no subject.[26] What remains is that relation has being only in knowledge. Though we use the verb *to be* in predicating relation, Gilbert seems to indicate that it is here a pure copula with no existential significance; it simply indicates the movement of the mind in passing from one term to another. If being is in no way distinguished from those forms which correspond to abstract concepts, relation and all the categories in-

[22] *Ibid.* (col. 1291d—1292b). Relation, he says, is predicated in such a way that the subject is not understood to be something by it (*ea esse aliquid intelligatur*), but solely *ex alieno adventu.*

[23] *Ibid.* (col. 1292c): "Quae vero relativa praedicatio tota consistit . . . non in eo quod est esse (quoniam nulli confert esse aliquid), sed potius consistit in eo quod est[1] habere se ad aliud, in comparatione alterius ad alterum." Hence relation can be applied to God without signifying any addition or change; the persons are distinct "extrinsecus affixarum rerum oppositione" (*Ibid.* [col. 1293c, 1296a-b]). St. Thomas says that these relations are either nothing at all, and then the Persons are not distinct, or they are something but not the divine substance itself, and then there is composition in God (*De Pot.*, 8. 2).

[24] Hayen, *art. cit.*, pp. 66-72.

[25] *In de Trin.* (*PL*, LXIV, 1294b-c): "Restat igitur, ut illa tantum sunt individua, quae ex omnibus composita nullis aliis in toto possunt esse conformia, ut ex omnibus, quae et actu et natura fuerunt vel sunt vel futura sunt, Platonis collecta Platonitatis." Also cf. *In Lib. de Duab. Nat.* (*PL*, LXIV, 1372d).

[26] He had not conceived a propositional analysis of the form of Russell's theory of types which would leave relation, hypothetically, a "neutral entity."

volving relation must become properties of knowledge alone. And since relation is involved in all causality it is not far to the conclusion that the universe is an ideal structure.

ST. THOMAS: THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN *ESSE* AND *RATIO*

The refusal to admit that every distinct object of conceptual thought is a separate form in nature or that being is simply identical with such forms is fundamental in St. Thomas. Cajetan is following him when he remarks that the metaphysician treats relations as *per se* parts of real being, not as they abstract from real being; that is, he considers them in their being (*esse*) and not merely in their nature (*ad*).[27] St. Thomas makes this distinction in all the genera of accidents; they can be considered in their *esse* or in the proper concept (*ratio*) of their genus. And he accuses the Porretani of viewing them only in the second way.[28] Of course, this implies a difference in the way of being and the way of being thought which Gilbert did not recognize.

By summarizing a central article and the answer to one objection[29] we will see where the distinction fits into the theory of relation. Because relation has the least being of all the predicaments, he says, some have thought[30] that it is not among the primary objects of the intellect, which are things outside the soul, but among its secondary objects or intentions. Hence it would be in the intellect alone like the intentions of genus, species, or second substance. Against this position he alleges two arguments. First, Aristotle has divided the being of reason from the real being which is indicated by the ten predicaments.[31] But if relation were not among things outside the soul, *ad aliquid* would not be placed among the predicaments. Secondly, and here he gives the metaphysical basis of his theory, the good and perfection of things is found not only in that which inheres in them absolutely but also in their order to one another. Now this order is relation, and if a thing is ordered to another it is really referred to it and relation is something in it. On the basis of the types of order he then gives the divisions of real relations which we will consider later.

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[27] *In I Summae Theologicae*, 13. 7.

[28] *In I Sent.*, d. 8, 4. 3; d. 26, 2. 1; *ST*, I, 28. 2.

[29] *De Pot.*, 7. 9c and ad 7.

[30] He accepts this on the report of Averroes, *In XII Metaphysicorum*, 19 (*Commentaria in Opera Aristotelis* [Venice, 1562-76], Vol. VIII, F306B). Only once does St. Thomas add to the report: "Cui etiam Porretanarum opinio consentire videtur" (*In I Sent.*, d. 26, 2. 1).

Avicenna also refers to, but does not approve, this opinion. *Meta.*, III, 10 (*Opera* [Venice, 1508], F83va).

St. Albert names first Zeno, Alfarabi, and Avicenna, and then practically all the ancients except Plato and Aristotle as holding that *ad aliquid* was only a being of reason mixed with all the other predicaments by the comparison which reason makes between them. *Liber de Praedicamentis*, III, 1 (ed. Borgnet [Vivès], I, 222-23).

[31] *Op. cit.* v. 7. 1017a 22-34; St. Thomas, *In V Meta.*, 9. 889.

But in the previous article he had said that relation, like action, does not make a composition with its subject and can be removed without a change in the subject. Now an objection is raised: relation in creatures cannot be real, for it is admittedly not substance; and it cannot be an accident because an accident composes with its subject and the subject is changed by the removal of the accident. St. Thomas answers by applying the distinction between the *esse* and *ratio* of relation, but in different terms—*relatio ut accidens* and *relatio ut relatio*. I quote this in full because every word and comparison is important and will be referred to frequently.

> *Reply to the Seventh Objection.* The very relation that is nothing but the order between one creature and another may be considered as an accident, or as a relation. Considered as an accident it is something adhering to a subject; but not considered as a relation or order, for then it is mere towardness, something passing as it were from one thing to another and assisting that which is related. Accordingly a relation is something inherent, but not because it is a relation: thus action as action is considered as issuing from the agent; but, as an accident, is considered as inherent to the active subject. Wherefore nothing prevents such an accident from ceasing to exist without any change in its subject, because it is not essentially complete through its existence in its subject [*sua ratio non perficitur prout est in ipso subjecto*] but through transition into something else: and if this be removed the essence [*ratio*] of this accident is removed as regards the action, but remains as regards its cause: even so, if the matter be removed, the heating is removed, although the cause of heating remain.[32]

We now ask: What is the general meaning of the distinction between *esse* and *ratio;* how does it apply to accidents; what is the *ratio* of relation? This will involve reviewing some well-known points, but it is necessary to have these in mind when dealing with relations and their discussion will clarify some foundations of the theory.

THE MEANING OF *ESSE* AND *RATIO*

Esse, says St. Thomas, has two meanings. As the copula in a proposition it signifies the composition which the mind makes in an enunciation and is only in the intellect. Secondly it means the act of existing, that by which something is and is denominated an actual being in nature. Only thus is it attributed to the things signified by the predicaments.[33] This *esse* is not one among forms nor identical with all forms; it is that actuality of every form or nature which places it in the realm of actual existence. It is compared to form or

[32] *De Pot.*, 7. 9 ad 7. This article is a dividing line; it is the only place where the two arguments are given together. Previously he had used only the first; after this he uses only the second.

[33] *Quodlibet. IX*, a. 3; *In I Sent.*, d. 19, 5. 1 ad 1; *In II Sent.*, d. 6, 2. 2; *ST*, I, 3. 4 ad 2.

essence as act to potency, and it is limited and distinguished by the potency of the nature which it actuates.[34]

The term *being* (*ens*) is derived from *esse* but signifies *that which* has *esse* precisely as having *esse;* being is that which exists.[35] Therefore its meanings are parallel to those of *esse*. It may signify whatever has *esse* in the intellect, that is, anything of which an affirmative proposition can be made. Thus negations and privations are called beings; they are beings of reason. But as attributed to the predicaments *being* signifies that which exists in nature with all its substantial and accidental determinants. Whatever has being in the second sense may also have it in the first, since what exists can be known. But the converse is not true. We can make affirmative propositions about negations and privations but they are not beings in nature; they signify precisely a want of being.[36]

Essence (*essentia*) is in turn derived from being and signifies that which has *esse*, but only what has *esse* in nature and not that which has *esse* in cognition alone.[37] Being is that which exists as existing, that is, it emphasizes the possession of *esse*. Essence is that which can exist, that is, it emphasizes the potentiality of that which receives, limits, determines *esse*. Essence makes being this being or this kind of being and renders it distinct from other beings or other classes of beings; it makes it *something* (*aliquid=aliud quid*). Now we cannot conceive *esse*, but we can conceive certain kinds of things that have *esse;* and so in answer to the question, What is it? we express an essence. Hence essence as signified by a definition is called *quiddity*. As tending to operation it is called nature; as that *by which* a thing is *what* it is, it is called form; in a special reference to knowledge it is called the *ratio*.[38] The latter we shall consider in a moment.

God's essence is to be; that is, essence and *esse* are identical in him. No other essence is to be; hence in all other beings essence and *esse* are distinct and composed. Moreover in the realm of being of which we have direct knowledge, that is, sensible substances, that form in them by which we conceive and define them is the same for many.

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[34] *De Pot.*, 7. 2 ad 9. Because in composites form is the principle bearer and determinant of being, and because in predication the *esse* of the predicate has a formal character in respect to the subject, *esse* is sometimes called a form; it is the form by which substance is called being. Cf. *CG*, II, 54; *Quodlibet. IX*, 6; *ST*, I, 3. 5; 4. 1 ad 3; 7. 1.

[35] *In I Sent.*, d. 8, 1. 1; *In II Sent.*, d. 37, 1. 1; *De Ver.*, 1. 1; *De Pot.*, 7. 2 sed contra 3; *In IV Meta.*, 2. 558; *In XII Meta.*, 1. 2419; *ST*, I, 13. 11 ad 1.

[36] *De Ente*, 1; *In II Sent.*, d. 34, 1. 1; *De Pot.*, 7. 2 ad 1; *De Malo*, 1. 1 ad 2; *ST*, I, 48. 2 ad 2. As the source of this distinction he refers always to Aristotle *Meta.* v. 7. 1017a 22-35.

Therefore truth is always founded on some *esse* (*In I Sent.*, d. 19, 5. 1 ad 5; *ST*, I, 16. 3 ad 2).

Since all beings can be known, logic has as broad an extent as philosophy: *De Ver.*, 1. 1 ad 7; *In IV Meta.*, 4. 574; *In V Meta.*, 9. 896.

[37] *De Ente*, 1. "Thing" (*res*) signifies the same as essence (*De Ver.*, 1. 1).

[38] For these various meanings, cf. *De Ente*, 1; *De Pot.*, 9. 1; 9. 2 ad 6; *In V Meta.*, 10. 902-4; *In VII Meta.*, 2. 1270-75; *ST*, I, 29. 1 ad 4; 29. 2c; 85. 2 ad 3.

In other words we conceive and define a class, a species; to the individuals of the class we can only point and give what is called grammatically a proper name. Yet the class as such does not exist, but the individuals do. Hence *that which* exists besides the conceivable form must contain another element which distinguishes it from other individuals with the same conceivable form. This is matter; and the composite of form and matter is the sensible substance which exists. Form and matter conceived not *in individuo* (this matter and this form cannot be conceived), but *in communi* make the essence of sensible substance. Therefore, sensible substance has a twofold composition: of form and matter within essence; of essence and *esse;* and St. Thomas admits no other composition within the order of substance.[39]

How do we grasp these principles in knowledge? St. Thomas begins with the senses. The only way we know that something is, is by our sense contact with existing things through which the intellect reads what they are and that they are. We may pass over the abstractive process here. In the intellect St. Thomas distinguishes two operations. The first is conception, which is ordered to essences; it is the formation of simple concepts of things through understanding their quiddities. The second is judgment, which is ordered to the *esse* of things and operates through composition and division. It is the completion and perfection of knowledge in which is found truth.[40]

For our purpose an important difference in these two operations is to be noted. When the intellect in the judgment separates (or joins) objects which in their existence are not separate (or joined), it is false. But in the first operation the intellect can legitimately separate some objects which are joined in existence. This is not false because we do not judge that the objects *are* separately but only look at them separately.[41] With this in mind we go on to consider further this first operation, for what the intellect grasps here as the term is precisely the *ratio.* This is not identical with the *species intelligibilis*, which is rather received in the intellect and becomes its specifying coprinciple of operation. The *ratio* is the term of this operation by which the intellect forms the object in itself. St. Thomas designates it variously as *conceptus*, *intentio*, and *verbum intellectus;* it is the definition which is externally signified by the word.[42]

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[39] *ST*, I, 50. 2 ad 3; 29. 2 ad 3; *De Pot.*, 7. 4c.

[40] *In Boet. de Trin.*, 5. 3; 6. 2; *In I Sent.*, d. 19, 5. 1; *De Ver.*, 1. 3; *In VI Meta.*, 4. 1232; *ST*, I, 85. 5. That conception is a knowledge of indivisibles is derived from Aristotle *Meta.* viii. 3. 1043b 33 ff. and *The Soul* iii. 6. Cf. St. Thomas, *In VIII Meta.*, 3. 1722 ff.; *In III de Anima*, 1. 3; *ST*, I, 85. 8; I-II, 52. 1.

For studies of these two operations and their relevance to truth cf. G. B. Phelan, "Verum Sequitur Esse Rerum," *Mediaeval Studies*, I (1939), 11 ff.; A. Marc, "L'Idée de l'être," *Archives de philosophie*, X (1933), Cahier I, 80-85.

[41] *In Boet. de Trin.*, 5. 3; *De Spir. Creat.*, a. 11 ad 7; *ST*, I, 85. 1 ad 1.

[42] *CG*, I, 53; *De Ver.*, 8. 6; 21. 3 ad 5; *In V Meta.*, 10. 902; *In XII Meta.*, 8. 2540; *ST*, I, 14. 4 and 85. 2 ad 1; *De Pot.*, 8. 1. More will be said later about the meaning of *intentio;* for its chief uses cf. H. D. Simonin, "La Notion d' 'intentio' dans l'oeuvre de S. Thomas d'Aquin," *Rev. de sciences phil. et théol.*, XIX (1930), 445-61.

The last point might easily lead to an error. Every definition is a *ratio;* but the *ratio* extends beyond definitions. Whenever we grasp something in a concept, that is a *ratio* whether or not we can define it by genus and specific difference. In a very important discussion of the *ratio* in an early work[43] St. Thomas bring this out. By *ratio*, he says, we mean nothing else than that which the intellect understands as the signification of any name. In things which have a definition, it is the definition. But some things cannot be defined through genus and species, for example, the supreme genera or wisdom as predicated of God, for God is not in a genus. Yet the intellect understands something in these names and what it understands is the *ratio* of those things.

He then asks how the *ratio* can be said to be in things. He answers that it is in the thing precisely in so far as there is something in the thing which corresponds, as the signified to the sign, to the concept in the intellect which we call a *ratio*. Or, as he says in answer to an objection,[44] the *ratio* has a twofold stability (*firmitatem*): first, that of its *esse*, and this it has from the intellect as an accident from its subject; secondly, that of its truth, and this it has from that to which it is conformed. Sometimes it has an *immediate foundation* in the thing and is its similitude. The name signifying such a concept can be said of the thing, e.g., "man." Such are called first intentions or *prima intellecta*, and among them are the ten predicaments.[45] Sometimes, however, the concept is not an immediate similitude of the thing but follows on our way of understanding the thing. Thus "genus" is not something existing in things; but when the intellect understands the *ratio* "animal" as being common to many species, it attributes to it the intention of genus. These have their immediate foundation in the intellect and their *remote foundation* in things, since the concepts to which they are attributed are similitudes of things. Hence they are called second intentions. The *ratio* then is in things only in the first instance where it has an immediate foundation in the thing and is its similitude.

Since these first intentions are the similitudes of things, the question arises: How many similitudes, *rationes*, can we have of one thing? We have seen that there are only three distinct principles in the substantial being of sensible things, namely, *esse*, matter, and form. If we were to accept this view of substance and Gilbert's theory of the parallelism of knowledge and things, we should say that from one thing only three concepts could be drawn even if all three principles were conceivable. Yet from the man John Smith we apparently draw

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[43] *In I Sent.*, d. 2, 1. 3.
[44] *Ibid.*, ad 4.
[45] Cf. *De Pot.*, 7. 9.

many concepts of the substantial order which can be separate objects of thought, e.g., man, substance, body, animal, rational, etc.

Without giving up the three principles, St. Thomas explains this plurality of concepts by showing: 1) that the intellect does not grasp the whole substance of a thing in one concept, or if it does this it can analyse the thing into parts which can be considered separately; 2) that the *ratio* as such abstracts from the mode of being which its object has in the subject from which it is drawn; 3) that this separate consideration, because it is not a judgment of separateness in existence, is not a falsification, as we have already seen.

Technically this is elaborated in St. Thomas's theory of the *natura absoluta*.[46] *Esse* and being may be in things or in the intellect. But essence can be considered absolutely, i.e., without relation to either way in which it may have *esse*, and is thus signified by an abstract term. In this consideration it includes only what belongs to the comprehension of the concept. Humanity, for instance, includes animality and rationality which in turn may be resolved into other concepts, such as corporality, life, sentience. In Socrates (*a* man) this essence exists as singular, completely individuated, and with all the determinants, substantial or accidental, united by one *esse* which makes the existent. In the intellect it (man) exists as universal, common—a species, that is, with those second intentions which result from the comparison the intellect makes between it and things or other concepts. Hence we cannot say that Socrates is humanity (a *ratio*) or even that he is man (a species), but only that he is a man, which signifies both the essence by which he is man and, in an indeterminate manner, all that accompanies that essence in this individual existent.

Neither abstract nor concrete terms necessarily signify distinct physical forms in the subject, although in predication they always signify formally, that is, as that by which a subject shares a determined degree of being.[47] We say that man is composed of animal and rational, but this does not mean that these are two things making a third; rather they are two concepts making a third of which they are a more detailed explication. It is true that some concepts derive from one principle of a thing rather than another. For instance, St. Thomas says, the genus is drawn from matter and the specific difference from form. But animal does not signify the body, nor rational the soul, of Socrates, for the whole of Socrates is animal and rational because he is a man. Here, then, we have many concepts derived

[46] *De Ente*, 3 and 4; *De Ver.*, 3. 8 ad 2; *De Pot.*, 9. 2 ad 1, 2, 6; *In VII Meta.*, 5. 1378-80; 9. 1467-69.

[47] In sensible things (the connatural objects of our intellect) the form determines the grade of being, and things are said to have being according to their form (*CG*, II, 54; *De Pot.*, 5. 4 ad 1; *ST*, I, 42. 1 ad 1). Since every *ratio* signifies some determination of being, it has the mode of a form in predication. Cf. *In I Periherm.*, 8: "Praedicatum comparatur ad subjectum ut forma ad materiam." Cf. also *ibid.*, 10; *In IX Meta.*, 11. 1898; *ST*, I, 13. 12.

from a thing which has real diversity in it, but not all indicating distinct forms.

Consider another extreme. God is absolutely simple yet we predicate many *rationes* of him. Are they in any way similitudes of the being of God? St. Thomas's answer to this brings out the abstraction of the *ratio* from *esse*.[48] Although in himself God is the fullest and most intelligible being, he is not so to us. Because he does not enter our sense experience we can draw no concept directly from him. Our concepts are derived from those material things which he causes and which are the connatural objects of our intelligence. *What* the concept signifies is just what we understand by it independently of any mode of being which may qualify it in this or that subject. But its mode of signifying in predication normally follows the mode of being it has in the *subject from which* it is drawn. Nevertheless, because in itself the *ratio* abstracts *esse*, we may, when we concretize it in judgment and predication, give it a mode of signification according as we understand its mode of being in the *subject to which* we apply it.

For instance, we say that Jones is wise and that God is wise. We draw our concept of wisdom from men like Jones. We know that he did not have wisdom from the cradle, that he acquired it by long experience and thought, and that he can lose it. It is, then, something added to, and somehow distinct from, that which makes him simply a man, although it is a natural development of those potencies or capacities inherent in that which makes him a man. It has therefore the mode of being which we call accident, and that is its normal mode of signification in judgment.

How can we apply it to God who has no accidents? First, wisdom by its concept alone signifies no mode of being except what it is, that is, the unmixed intellectual perfection of being wise. Secondly, we know something *aliunde* of God: that as pure act he is immutable, perfect, simple, etc.; that as first cause of things he must have in himself in some way what he puts in his effects, but without their imperfections and multiplicity; that he is the cause of intellect and wisdom. Thirdly, the judgment is an act of intelligence, not a mechanism of forms like a combination lock whose cylinders fall into place at the turn of a knob. When we apply a predicate to a subject we intend it to signify in the way we understand it *is* in the subject; if that is not the normal way, the insight of intelligence corrects the normal.

When we say that Jones is wise, then, we apply the same *ratio* and with the same propositional structure as when we say that God is wise. But we do not mean the same kind of *is* and, therefore, not the

[48]These remarks on our knowledge of God are drawn from the following passages: *In I Sent.*, d. 2, 1. 3; d. 22, 1. 1; *In XII Meta.*, 7. 2543; *De Pot.*, 7. 6, 7; *ST*, I, 12. 1, 4; 13. 1-5.

same manner of wisdom. God's wisdom is not something which is acquired, which can be lost, which is merely a "more" or a "most" with respect to human wisdom; it has a different manner of being in God because it is his being. And so it is with every other *ratio* which we draw from creatures and apply to God; their different reference to being in God and creatures prevents their univocal predication.

The reason, then, for the plurality of attributes which we attribute to God is twofold, or one looked at from two aspects: the supereminent perfection and unity of God which the human intellect cannot grasp—*Deus superat intellectum nostrum;* and the fact that our concepts of his perfection are drawn from his effects where they are multiple and deficient owing to their different mode of being. These *rationes* have an immediate *fundamentum* in God which renders their predication of him true; but in themselves they do not express the unified and perfect being they have in God; because of that we have no concept.[49]

Hence it is the condition of our intellect that it cannot always grasp what is one in one concept nor include in one concept the real diversity in a thing. That is true of our first concept, being, which must be thought through the other transcendentals and the genera in order that its virtualities may be seen.[50] The material individual cannot be exhausted in one concept because its individuating matter escapes the abstractive understanding and its accidents are not included in the concept of its essence. Finally no concept reaches the act of existing itself; only in the judgment do we know existence, in the assent to the union of objects signifying their union in *esse*.[51] Hence the plurality of concepts drawn from a thing and their compositions is no index of the number of separate forms and compositions in the thing. The *ratio* does not indicate existence but an intelligible determination of existence: *Ratio autem non significat esse, sed esse quid, id est quid aliquid est.*[52] Neither does it signify a physical form, but metaphysical form or determination of being; and one physical form may be the source of many such determinations.[53]

In a way it may be said of everything *superat intellectum nostrum.* That is why the intellect, to conform itself as far as possible to the

[49]It might be put this way: We know *what* wisdom is; we know what human wisdom *is;* we know *that* wisdom *is* in God; we know something of what wisdom *is not* in God; we do not know what wisdom *is* in God.

[50]*De Ver.*, 1. 1.

[51]*In I Sent.*, d. 19, 5. 1 ad 7; *De Ver.*, 1. 3; *ST*, I, 3. 6; 86. 1; *De Pot.*, 7. 4. That properties are not included in the essence is a consequence of the doctrine of the *natura absoluta* in which he draws heavily on Avicenna as Scotus did in another way. Cf. Gilson, "Avicenne et le point de départ de Duns Scot," *Archives d'hist. doct. et litt. du moyen âge*, II (1927), 129 ff.; Roland-Gosselin, *Le "De Ente et Essentia" de s. Thomas d'Aquin*, p. 24, n. 1 ff.; p. 150, n. 2.

[52]*De Pot.*, 8. 2 ad 11.

[53]*Ibid.*, 7. 7; 8. 4 ad 2; *In I Sent.*, d. 32, 1. 1; *In II Sent.*, d. 12, 1. 5 ad 2; *ST*, I

real, must have recourse to the twofold approach to truth: the way of analysis or resolution from the composite to the simple and from whole to part; and the inverse way of composition and synthesis.[54] And to test the truth of the synthesis it operates in judgment, it must somehow return through the senses to the things that nourish it and examine them and their relations.[55]

(*To be continued*)

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37. 2c. If anyone has doubts as to whether or not St. Thomas conceived every accident as a distinct form *secundum rei naturam*, it should be settled by *De Pot.*, 7. 10 ad 8: ". . . illud a quo aliquid denominatur, non oportet quod sit semper forma secundum rei naturam; sed sufficit quod significetur per modum formae, grammatice loquendo. Denominatur enim homo ab actione et ab indumento, quae realiter non sunt formae."

[54] *In II Meta.*, 1. 278; *ST*, I, 58. 4; 85. 5.

[55] *In Boet. de Trin.*, 6. 2; *De Ver.*, 12. 3 ad 2. Cf. Phelan, *art. cit.*, pp. 13 ff.

THE MUTABILITY-IMMUTABILITY PRINCIPLE IN ST. AUGUSTINE'S METAPHYSICS

PART II

Readers of St. Augustine's works are almost always struck by the constant mention of God. The theocentric character of Augustine's thought tinges all his philosophy, and provides us with a key to the understanding of his mind.[1] God is the ultimate good, which men should seek by knowledge and love. All philosophy, then, for St. Augustine, can be embraced in the ascent of the human mind to God.[2] And the soul's journey in thought to its Maker is at once a metaphysics, an epistemology, a psychology, a moral philosophy, and a mysticism.[3]

Though the ascent to God appears in various forms in many of St. Augustine's writings, there are some places where it is worked out in greater detail. One of the best known of these is the section in the second book of the *De Libero Arbitrio*[4] where St. Augustine considers the proof for the existence of God. The first part of the proof consists chiefly in setting up the proper hierarchy among the cognitive facul-

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[1]"Il y a donc une philosophie de saint Augustin. Mais chez lui, elle est si intimement liée à la théologie, que l'on ne peut les séparer . . . Augustin n'est pas un homme que l'on puisse couper en deux. Il n'y a jamais eu pour lui qu'une vérité, et cette vérité il la saisit, il l'embrasse de toute son âme, elle est pour lui comme une émanation de Dieu et devient la loi de son être." Portalie, "Saint Augustin," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, col. 2322.

"Whatever may be his other interests, Augustine's chief concern is about God. That is why St. Augustine is no longer a philosopher, but a philosophical-minded theologian. Without ever losing that intellectual curiosity which is the psychological stimulus of the philosopher, Augustine found in the omnipotence, eternity, and immutability of God the ultimate solutions to his greatest problems." Bourke, *Augustine's Quest of Wisdom*, p. 203.

Cf. also Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin*, pp. 42-43; Pegis, "In Defense of St. Augustine," *New Scholasticism*, XVIII (April, 1944), 113.

[2]Fr. Boyer quotes from *Epistola IV*, 2 (*PL*, XXXIII, 68): ". . . cum Deo in auxilium deprecato, et in ipsum, et in ea quae verissime vera sunt attolli coepero, tanta nonnunquam rerum manentium praesumptione compleor, ut mirer interdum illa mihi opus esse ratiocinatione, ut haec credam, quae tanta insunt praesentia, quanta sibi quisque sit praesens." He (i.e., Fr. Boyer) adds: "Il y a là, déjà formé, le coeur de la philosophie augustinienne." *Christianisme et néoplatonisme dans la formation de saint Augustin*, p. 182.

Cf. also E. I. Watkin, "The Mysticism of St. Augustine," *A Monument to St. Augustine*, p. 106.

[3]Cf. Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

[4]*De Libero Arbitrio*, II, 3-15 (*PL*, XXXII, 1243-63). For parallel passages see: *Confessiones*, VII, 17. 23 (*PL*, XXXII, 745); *De Vera Religione*, 29. 52-31. 58 (*PL*, XXXIV, 145-48).

ties in man. Lowest on the ladder are the external senses;[5] then come the internal senses, which judge the external senses;[6] and on the top rung is human reason, which judges both internal and external sensation.[7] Above human reason there can be nothing but that which is unchanging.[8] But is there such an unchanging being? To answer this crucial question, St. Augustine again leads us up a ladder, this time the ladder of the objects of cognition.[9] The conclusion reached is that the object of the highest cognitive function, reason, is the eternal and immutable truth common to all minds that share true knowledge.[10] Therefore there must be an existing immutable truth; and, for St. Augustine, this truth can be none other than He who said, "I am the truth."[11]

The part played by the contrast between mutability and immutability in this typically Augustinian proof for God's existence is in evidence throughout the passage. The whole of the ascent is from the senses and their fluctuating objects to the reason and the immutable verities with which it deals. Objects of human reason cited by St. Augustine in this passage are those things that he considered classic examples of absolute immutability: the unchanging ratios between numbers and the eternal and unchanging norms of wise judgment and action.[12] The contrast between mutability and immutability appears most clearly in the way that St. Augustine immediately jumps from the truth common to all minds to the Truth that is God.[13] To St. Augustine, the goal was reached once he had come to the absolutely immutable; for only One could be the possessor and ruler of the realm of the unchanging.

This proof for God, derived from the human mind and the truth it knows, is in many ways the answer to most of the problems that faced St. Augustine.[14] To have arrived at a truth that is absolute and whose

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[5]*Ibid.*, II, 3. 8-9 (*PL*, XXXII, 1244-45).
[6]*Ibid.*, 3. 8 to 5. 12 (col. 1244-47).
[7]*Ibid.*, 6. 13 (col. 1248).
[8]*Ibid.*, 6. 14 (col. 1248).
[9]*Ibid.*, 7. 15-13. 37 (col. 1249-61).
[10]"Promiseram autem, si meministi, me tibi demonstraturum esse aliquid quod sit mente nostra atque ratione sublimius. Ecce tibi est ipsa veritas: amplectere illam si potes, et fruere illa . . ." *Ibid.*, 13. 35 (col. 1260).
[11]"Ecce tibi est ipsa veritas: amplectere illam si potes, et fruere illa, et delectare in Domino, et dabit tibi petitiones cordis tui." *Ibid.*
Cf. *De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII*, 54 (*PL*, XL, 38); also Boyer, *L'Idée de vérité dans la philosophie de saint Augustin*, pp. 114-15.
[12]*De Lib. Arb.*, II, 8. 20—11. 32 (*PL*, XXXII, 1251-58).
[13]*Ibid.*, 13. 35 (col. 1260).
Cf. also *De Vera Rel.*, 31. 57 (*PL*, XXXIV, 147) ". . . inc:ommutabilem naturam, quae supra rationalem animam sit, Deum esse; et ibi esse primam vitam et primam essentiam, ubi est prima sapientia. Nam haec est illa incommutabilis veritas, quae lex omnium artium recte dicitur."
[14]Cf. Pegis, "In Defense of St. Augustine," *op. cit.*, p. 106. For the connection of the proof for God with illumination see Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 135: "Dieu est avec toutes choses; l'homme seul, s'il le veut, peut être avec Dieu, car cette présence universelle

existence is demonstrated, is his complete and final answer to the sceptics.[15] The existence of a necessary, unchanging Mind is the basis for an absolute certitude. But beyond the mere acquiring of a guarantee for human cognition, the attainment of divine Truth is the gaining of true wisdom; for only by leaving behind the mutable things of creation and rising above itself to its God can a human soul become wise.[16] With wisdom comes happiness, since to be wise is the good and the happiness of man.[17]

For St. Augustine himself the problem of God was not a problem of his existence, but rather the problem of the nature of the divinity.[18] Here it is that we can see most clearly just how predominant in St. Augustine's mind was the theme of immutability.

God is the supreme being. As a matter of fact only he truly is being.[19] Only of him can we rightly use the word essence, the Greek *ousia*.[20] The reason is that all other things either actually do change or are able to be changed and so do not fully possess their being.[21] Because God is absolutely immutable he alone truly is. One of the most striking confirmations of the intimate link between fullness of being and immutability in St. Augustine's thought is the way in which he uses the text of Exodus "I am who am."[22] The text occurs quite frequently, and almost invariably St. Augustine will interpret

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de Dieu aux créatures, l'homme seul l'expérimente et la connait.

"Par là, et par là seulement, la théorie augustinienne de la connaissance et la preuve de l'existence de Dieu qu'elle supporte trouvent leur signification véritable. C'est les mal interpreter que d'y voir un enchainement de concepts abstraits artificieusement associés en vue de rendre évidente l'existence de Dieu; tout au contraire, le point de vue de saint Augustin suppose que cet enchainement de concepts et le mouvement même de la pansée qui les enchaine, ne puissent être rendus intelligibles que par la présence de Dieu qui meut la pensée vers soi."

[15]Cf. Boyer, *L'Idée de vérité*, pp. 21, 31.

[16]This is always Augustine's aim: to acquire wisdom for himself and others. That is why a book like the *De Trinitate* is ". . . not a textbook in dogmatic theology but an exercise in the method of intellectual contemplation which finds its climax in the celestial vision of the eternal, incorporeal, and immutable things of God." Bourke, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

[17]"Et quid beatius eo qui fruitur inconcussa et incommutabili et excellentissima veritate?" *De Lib. Arb.*, II, 13. 35 (*PL*, XXXII, 1260). Cf. also *ibid.*, 19. 52 (col. 1268).

[18]Cf. Karl Adam, *St. Augustine, The Odyssey of His Soul*, pp. 10-11.

[19]"Id enim vere est, quod incommutabiliter manet." *Conf.*, VII, 11. 17 (*PL*, XXXII, 742). Cf. also *De Vera Rel.*, 18. 35 (*PL*, XXXIV, 137).

Throughout the fifth book of the *De Trinitate*, Augustine uses God's immutability as a medium of demonstration in proving that God is true being.

[20]". . . fortasse solum Deum dici oporteat essentiam." *De Trinitate*, VII, 5. 10 (*PL*, XLII, 942).

[21]"Est tamen sine dubitatione substantia, vel, si melius hoc appellatur, essentia, quam Graeci *ousian* vocant. . . . Aliae quae dicuntur essentiae sive substantiae, capiunt accidentia, quibus in eis fiat vel magna vel quantacumque mutatio: Deo autem aliquid ejusmodi accidere non potest; et ideo sola est incommutabilis substantia vel essentia, qui Deus est." *Ibid.*, V, 2. 3 (col. 912).

[22]"God said to Moses: I am who am. . . . Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He who is, hath sent me to you." Exod. 3:14.

the words of Scripture as meaning that God is absolutely immutable.[23] This—of all occasions—would have been the one for St. Augustine t assert the supremacy of existence as a transcendental, as the actua tion of all other perfections, and so to anticipate the great insight o St. Thomas Aquinas. Instead, St. Augustine treats existence an immutability as if they were parallel perfections and even seems t make immutability more fundamental.[24]

Apropos of this Augustinian exegesis of the passage just referred t it might be mentioned that some of the other passages in Scriptur where God's immutability are spoken of undoubtedly influenced S Augustine's outlook. For, as he himself said, "Greater is the autho ity of Scripture than the capacity of all human genius."[25] Some o the passages mentioned by St. Augustine himself are: "Thou shal change them and they shall be changed; but Thou remainest th same":[26] "Every good gift and every perfect gift is come down fro the father of lights, with whom there is no change, nor any shadow o alteration."[27]

Bodies, as we have seen, are mutable both in time and space. Sou while immutable in place, still changes in time. God, the absolutel immutable, changes neither in time nor in place.[28] From this divin prerogative there immediately flow the attributes of ubiquity an eternity. If God is to be absolutely unchanging so far as place is con cerned, there can be no place where God is not; for if there were, th possibility would always be that God would begin to exist in a ne place, and God would not be completely immutable.[29] So, also, ther is no succession in God of states of existence, nor passage from on time to another; for this would involve change. Consequently, Go

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[23]"Vere enim ipse est, quia incommutabilis est; omnis enim mutatio facit non es quod erat." *De Natura Boni*, 19 (*PL*, XLII, 557).

Cf. also *De Vera Rel.*, 49. 97 (*PL*, XXXIV, 165); *De Trin.*, VII, 5. 10 (*PL*, XLI 942); *ibid.*, V, 2. 3 (col. 912); *De Genesi ad Litteram*, V, 16 (*PL*, XXXIV, 333); *D Civitate Dei*, VIII, 11, (*PL*, XLI, 236).

[24]" Vere enim ipse est, *quia* incommutabilis est." *De Nat. Boni*, 19 (*PL*, XLII, 557)

[25]". . . major est quippe Scripturae hujus auctoritas, quam omnis humani ingen capacitas." *De Gen. ad Litt.*, II, 5. 9 (*PL*, XXXIV, 267).

[26]Ps. 101:27, 28.

[27]Jas. 1:17. Cf. *De Nat. Boni*, 24 (*PL*, XLII, 558); *De Trin.*, I, 1. 2 (*PL*, XLII, 821)

[28]". . . neque contineatur et quasi diffundatur locis, neque protendatur atque vari tur temporibus . . ." *De Lib. Arb.*, II, 16. 44 (*PL*, XXXII, 1264).

". . . substantiam vero Dei nisi credat nec per tempus nec per locum moveri, no dum perfecte incommutabilem credit." *De Gen. ad Litt.*, VIII, 22. 43 (*PL*, XXXIV 389). The entire section of *De Gen. ad Litt.*, VIII, 20-26, contrasts God's immuta bility with the other lower levels of mutability: soul and bodies.

Cf. also *De Vera Rel.*, 43, 81 (*PL*, XXXIV, 159); *De Gen. ad Litt.*, VII, 2. 3 (*PL* XXXIV, 357); *De Div. Quaest. LXXXIII*, 54 (*PL*, XL, 38).

[29]"Haec autem facit atque agit unus verus Deus; sed sicut Deus, id est ubique totus nullis inclusus locis, nullis vinculis alligatus, in nullas partes sectilis, ex nulla part mutabilis, implens coelum et terram praesente potentia, non indigente natura." *D Civ. Dei*, VII, 30 (*PL*, XLI, 220).

as all his existence simultaneously; that is, he is eternal.[30] Like St. Thomas after him,[31] St. Augustine is careful to point out that the essence of eternity does not consist in having always existed, but in absolute immutable existence. Even if creatures had coexisted with God from all eternity, they would still not be strictly in eternity; for they would be mutable and would only enjoy their perfections successively.[32]

As far as St. Augustine himself was concerned, one of the key attributes of God, one that particularly distinguished the God of Christianity from the God of sects such as Manichaeanism, is spirituality.[33] In the *Confessions* St. Augustine tells us of the struggle he had when he tried to conceive of God as other than a material being.[34] What a being would be if it were not material he could not imagine. Yet he saw that materiality would involve changeableness; and mutability was one thing that St. Augustine would never agree to place in God.[35] Through his contact with Platonism St. Augustine gained the notion of the spiritual and thus equipped saw that the full perfection of spirituality could belong only to that being in which there was no trace of materiality, no remnant of mutability.[36]

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[30] "Illa est autem vera aeternitas, quae vera immortalitas; hoc est illa summa incommutabilitas, quam solus Deus habet, qui mutari omnino non potest." *De Nat. Boni*, 39 (*PL*, XLII, 563).

Cf. also *De Trin.*, XV, 5. 7 (*PL*, XLII, 1062); *De Nat. Boni*, 1 (*PL*, XLII, 551).

[31] Cf. *ST*, I, 10, particularly the body of the third article.

[32] "Si enim recte discernuntur aeternitas et tempus, quod tempus sine aliqua mobili mutabilitate non est, in aeternitate autem nulla mutatio est; quis non videat, quod tempora non fuissent, nisi creatura fieret, quae aliquid aliqua motione mutaret; . . ." *De Civ. Dei.* XI, 6 (*PL*, XLI, 321).

"Mentis quippe aspectu omnem mutabilitatem ab aeternitate sejungo, et in ipsa aeternitate nulla spatia temporis cerno; quia spatia temporis praeteritis et futuris rerum motibus constant. Nihil autem praeterit in aeterno, et nihil futurum est; quia ut quod praeterit, esse desinit, et quod futurum est, nondum esse coepit: aeternitas autem, tantummodo est; nec fuit, quasi jam non sit; nec erit, quasi adhuc non sit." *De Vera Rel.*, 49. 97 (*PL*, XXXIV, 165).

[33] Cf. *De Civ. Dei.* VIII, 6 (*PL*, XLI, 231), where Augustine praises the Platonists for having attained to God as spiritual and immutable.

His freeing himself of the prejudice that all things are material led Augustine to the solution of his two greatest problems: the nature of God, and the nature of evil. Cf. Bourke, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

[34] *Conf.*, VII, 1. 1 (*PL*, XXXII, 733).

[35] ". . . quaecumque tamen esset, sic eam quaerendam videbam, ut non per illam constringerer Deum incommutabilem mutabilem credere." *Ibid.*, 3. 4 (col. 735).

"Sed me non sinebas illis fluctibus cogitationis auferri ab ea fide, qua credebam et esse te et esse incommutabilem substantiam tuam." *Ibid.*, 7. 11 (col. 739).

In a letter against Secundinus, Augustine is very strong in his condemnation of any doctrine which introduces mutability into the nature of God. "Haec ergo mutabilitas cum esse in substantia summi boni, hoc est, in substantia Dei creditur, si contentiosus non es, vides quanta insipientia blasphematur." *Contra Secundinum Manichaeum*, I, 19 (*PL*, XLII, 595). Cf. also *In Joannis Evangelium*, I, 8 (*PL*, XXXV, 1383).

[36] On the influence of Platonic writings on the intellectual conversion of Augustine see Boyer, *Christianisme et néoplatonisme*, p. 193: ". . . tout en reconnaissant la prépondérance définitive de la foi chrétienne dans l'esprit d'Augustin, dès avant l'épisode des livres 'platoniciens', nous avons laissé au néoplatonisme un rôle con-

The more one studies St. Augustine and notes the place of immutability in relation to the other divine attributes, the more it seems that immutability is the basis on which the other attributes rest, the root from which they spring.[37] Since God is immutable, he must be simple.[38] Because the immutably simple can have no parts, God is invisible.[39] God himself is immutable beatitude because he possesses entirely and unalterably the supreme good;[40] and as the object of the contemplation that constitutes man's beatitude, God must be supremely beautiful.[41]

A more difficult problem arises when one deals with the divine operations, for here it would seem that there must be some sort of mutability. St. Augustine, however, is intransigent in his contention

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siderable dans la formation de la pensée augustinienne. Les principes que le saint a, dès cette époque, empruntés à ce système, gardent encore quelque chose d'un peu vague, mais tels qu'ils sont, comment douter de leur importance? Les vraies réalités, soustraites à l'espace et au temps, échappent à la prise des sens. Les atteindre, c'est le privilège et la fin des choses changeantes, qui, par suite, sont bonnes en ce qu'elles sont, mais peuvent être mauvaises en ce qui leur manque. Ces simples propositions ne suffisent-elles pas à déterminer la direction d'une philosophie?"

See also Bourke, *op. cit.*, p. 67: "Augustine underwent two conversions while he was resident in Milan. The one was intellectual; the other volitional. His intellect was turned toward the spiritual world, which had been hidden from him during his Manichean period. There can be little doubt that Neoplatonic philosophy was the chief natural agency in bringing about this development of his thought. It provided him with a method of thinking about immaterial being; and if later he almost restricts his interests to this type of object, to God and his own soul, it must never be forgotten that this step in the evolution of his mind was made possible by the philosophy of the Platonists." Cf. also Pegis, "In Defense of St. Augustine," *op. cit.*, p. 105; B. Jansen, "Geist und Form der Philosophie des h. Augustinus," *Miscellanea Augostiniana*, p. 278.

On the question of the extent to which Augustine knew the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and others see Alfaric, *L'Evolution intellectuelle de saint Augustin*, pp. 232-33, 375-76. Cf. also Bourke, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-55.

[37]This placing of immutability as the "metaphysical essence" of God in St. Augustine's philosophy is not accepted by all Augustinian scholars. Two of the most prominent commentators on Augustine place simplicity and unity as the core attribute of God. Portalie, *op. cit.*, col. 2345, says: "Parmi les attributs de Dieu la simplicité est la caractéristique qu'il met en saillie." He is seconded in this view by Dr. M. Schmaus, *Die psychologische Trinitatslehre des hl. Augustinus*, p. 86: "Das tiefste Wesen der göttlichen Einfachheit enthüllt sich uns erst, wenn wir ihren metaphysischen Charakter ins Auge fassen. Hier öffnet sich uns ein weiter Blick in den Gottesbegriff unseres Kirchenvaters. Das ist die Signatur der augustinischen Gottesidee: Gott ist das absolut einfache Sein."

[38]". . . pariter simplex pariterque incommutabile bonum est et coaeternum." *De Civ. Dei*, XI, 10. 1 (*PL*, XLI, 325).

Cf. also *Conf.*, IV, 16. 29 (*PL*, XXXII, 704); *De Trin.*, VI, 6. 8 (*PL*, XLII, 930).

[39]". . . ipsum esse etiam mundi hujus visibilis et mutabilis invisibilem et incommutabilem conditorem." *Ibid.*, X, 18 (col. 297).

[40]". . . cum habeat aeternam atque incommutabilem beatitudinem, magisque sit ipsa aeterna et incommutabilis beatitudo." *De Gen. ad Litt.*, IV, 9. 18 (*PL*, XXXIV, 302).

[41]"Oportet igitur ut Creatorem, per ea quae facta sunt, intellectum conspicientes Trinitatem intelligamus, cujus in creatura, quomodo dignum est, apparet vestigium. In illa enim Trinitate summa origo est rerum omnium, et perfectissima pulchritudo, et beatissima delectatio." *De Trin.*, VI, 10. 12 (*PL*, XLII, 932).

Cf. also *De Civ. Dei*, IX, 22 (*PL*, XLI, 274).

that God is absolutely immutable.[42] God's knowledge is complete and simultaneous, with no succession of ideas one after the other.[43] Thus St. Augustine is provided with the core of his theory of predestination and providence.[44] God's knowledge and will never change; but God, seeing all things at once in his eternity, does not thereby compromise the freedom of man's choice.[45]

St. Augustine's explanation of divine providence was one of the most original and important contributions that he made to philosophic thought.[46] The world of the Greeks was basically a self-sufficient world, for it was uncreated and eternal. Precisely what explained the necessity and consistency of nature and of the laws of nature, the Greeks never succeeded in discovering.[47] With St. Augustine there is no problem, for his world is a created world, which depends for its very being on the power of the Creator. Creation is radically mutable; its preservation in existence and its orderly progress in perfection demand that there be an immutable Being to sustain and order it.[48]

God's position in relation to his creation is always, for St. Augustine, an intimate and active one. While St. Augustine frequently emphasizes the function of the *Verbum Dei* in the governance of the world, he speaks also of the appropriated operations of each of the divine Persons in guiding creation.[49] The Father is the immutable principle from which all proceeds; he is the source and cause of unity and therefore the cause of subsistence. The Son is the eternal Wisdom, the Word of the Father; and, as such, he is the fountain-head of

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[42]". . . immutabilis, mutans omnia . . . opera mutas nec mutas consilium." *Conf.*, I, 4. 4 (*PL*, XXXII, 662).

". . . numquid, sicut ista mutantur, ita ipsum Dei consilium, in quo ea disposuit, mutabile dicimus? Averterit ipse tantam dementiam!" *De Gen. ad Litt.*, IV, 5. 12 (*PL*, XXXIV, 300).

Cf. also *De Vera Rel.*, 17. 34 (*PL*, XXXIV, 136); *De Civ. Dei*, X, 12 (*PL*, XLI, 291).

[43]"Sicut ergo nosti in principio coelum et terram sine varietate notitiae tuae, ita fecisti in principio coelum et terram sine distentione actionis tuae." *Conf.*, XI, 31. 41 (*PL*, XXXII, 826).

". . . es incommutabiliter et scis incommutabiliter et vis incommutabiliter." *Ibid.*, XIII, 16. 19 (*PL*, XXXII, 853).

[44]Augustine's teaching on this point forms the bulk of the third book of the *De Libero Arbitrio*.

[45]"Cum enim sit praescius voluntatis nostrae, cujus est praescius ipsa erit. Voluntas ergo erit, quia voluntatis est praescius. Nec voluntas esse poterit, si in potestate non erit. Ergo et potestatis est praescius. Non igitur per ejus praescientiam mihi potestas adimitur, quae propterea mihi certior aderit, quia ille cujus praescientia non fallitur, adfuturam mihi esse praescivit." *De Lib. Arb.*, III, 3. 8 (*PL*, XXXII, 1275).

[46]Cf. Gilson, *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, pp. 154-57.

[47]This failure of even the greatest of the Greek thinkers can be traced in large part to their notion of matter as something uncreated and radically irrational. Cf. Pegis, "Matter, Beatitude and Liberty," *Maritain Volume of the Thomist*, V (January, 1943), pp. 265-80.

[48]". . . nisi permaneret incommutabilis, nulla mutabilis natura remaneret." *De Vera Rel.*, 10. 18 (*PL*, XXXIV, 130).

Cf. also *De Lib. Arb.*, II, 16. 44 (*PL*, XXXII, 1264).

[49]Cf. q. 18, "De Trinitate," in *De Div. Quaest. LXXXIII*, (*PL*, XL, 15).

form, of perfection, of intelligibility. The Holy Ghost is divine Love and the cause of finality and order in the universe.[50] In this description of the triple function of the providential activity of God, we see the source and the ultimate realization of the three elements of immutability which were found in bodies and in soul: proportion, form, and order.

We might single out in particular the notion of *modus*, and see how it finds its full expression in God. In all beings there is a certain "mean"; for wherever there is existence, there must be some limit to indetermination.[51] All creatures have at once this principle of determination and a principle of indetermination; but in God there is only determination, and *modus* as applied to God does not mean limit. Rather it points to the fact that he is perfectly proportioned, completely formed,[52] since he is perfectly simple and absolutely one.[53] God, then, is the supreme *Modus*.[54] Beings are arranged in a scale of varying proportions of determination and indetermination and therefore in graded proportions of mutability and immutability; for the principle of indetermination is matter, whose essence is mutability.[55]

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[50]". . . incommutabile principium, incommutabilem sapientiam, incommutabilem caritatem, unum Deum verum atque perfectum." *De Quantitate Animae*, 34. 77 (*PL*, XXXII, 1077).

Cf. also *De Vera Rel.*, 12. 24 (*PL*, XXXIV, 132); *De Civ. Dei*, VIII, 4 (*PL*, XLI, 227-29). This latter passage is interesting in that it links the action of God as *causa subsistendi, ratio intelligendi*, and *ordo vivendi*, with the Platonic division of philosophy into physics, logic, and morals.

[51]"Quae tamen etiam sic habens nonnullum modum et speciem et ordinem in quacumque extremitate adhuc, aliquod bonum est: quae si omnino detrahantur et penitus consumantur, ideo nullum bonum erit, quia nulla natura remanebit." *De Nat. Boni*, 9 (*PL*, XLII, 554).

[52]"Nec rursum moderatum oportet dici Deum, tamquam ab aliquo modum acceperit." *Ibid.*, 22 (col. 558).

[53]"Ipse autem ordinis modus vivit in veritate perpetua, nec mole vastus, nec protractione volubilis; sed potentia supra omnes locos magnus, aeternitate super omnia tempora immobilis; sine quo tamen nec ullius molis vastitas in unum redigi, nec ullius temporis productio potest ab errore cohiberi, et aliquid esse vel corpus ut corpus sit, vel motus ut motus sit. Ipsum est unum principale, nec per finitum nec per infinitum crassum, nec per finitum nec per infinitum mutabile. Non enim habet aliud hic, aliud alibi; aut aliud nunc, aliud postea: quia summe unus est Pater Veritatis, Pater suae Sapientiae . . ." *De Vera Rel.*, 43. 81 (*PL*, XXXIV, 159).

[54]"Deus itaque supra omnem creaturae modum est, . . . a quo omnis modus." *De Nat. Boni*, 3 (*PL*, XLII, 553). Cf. *ibid.*, 22 (col. 558).

"This concept of a supreme standard (modus) by which all lower truths are measured and regulated becomes one of the dominating ideas in Augustinian philosophy. God is soon recognized as this supreme *Modus*, the immutable Orderer of all things in existence and in knowledge." Bourke, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

[55]For Augustine's description of the scale of beings see especially the passages (referred to in n. 4) which contain the proof for God's existence.

"On peut ainsi concevoir l'univers comme une série ordonnée dont le degré supérieur est Dieu même, et dont les degrés inférieurs s'échelonnent selon leur plus ou moins grande participation à la nature divine. Comme le caractère de Dieu qui nous est le mieux connu est l'immutabilité, nous verrons les êtres descendre dans l'échelle des valeurs en proportion de leur capacité de changement. . . . Cette doctrine revient à affirmer pour la vérité la possibilité de se réaliser à différents degrés qui se placeront d'autant plus bas dans l'être qu'ils seront plus distants de l'immutabilité." Boyer, *L'Idée de vérité*, p. 120.

Permanence and determination, which go hand in hand, are given from above by God; mutability and formlessness flow from matter.[56]

Bound up with the peculiar function of the *Verbum Dei* in the governance of the world is the element of immutability that we have discussed.[57] The whole theory of "reasons," as proposed by St. Augustine, finds its culmination in his teaching on the "eternal reasons" (*rationes aeternae*).[58] Since these reasons are the exemplar ideas according to which all creation is formed,[59] they are said to belong to the Son of God, for he is the Wisdom of God.[60] These ideas in the divine mind are spoken of by St. Augustine as being the immutable causes of all mutable things;[61] or as being that by which, and according to which, divine Wisdom forms the universe.[62] The influence of the eternal reasons upon creatures is *formation* and *illumination*.[63] If there is truth in creatures, it is because eternal Truth and Wisdom have been impressed upon them.[64] That is why the Son of

[56]"Quia quantum adtinet ad illum a quo facta sunt, speciosa atque formosa sunt; quantum autem in ipsis est, possunt deficere, quia de nihilo facta sunt; et in quantum non deficiunt, non est eorum materiae, quae ex nihilo est, sed ejus, qui summe est, et illa facit esse in genere et ordine suo." *De Genesi Liber Imperfectus*, 12. 36 (*PL*, XXXIV, 235).

[57]Cf. *supra*.

[58]The classic passage on these *rationes aeternae* is *De Div. Quaest. LXXXIII*, 46 (*PL*, XL, 30-31).

[59]". . . tu es et Deus es Dominusque omnium quae creasti: et apud te rerum omnium instabilium stant causae; et rerum omnium mutabilium immutabiles manent origines; et omnium irrationabilium et temporalium sempiterne vivunt rationes." *Conf.*, I, 6. 9 (*PL*, XXXII, 664).

". . . secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest, et omne quod oritur et interit." *De Div. Quaest. LXXXIII*, 46. 2 (*PL*, XL, 30).

[60]". . . aeternis atque incommutabilibus et stabilibus rationibus coaeterni sibi Verbi sui." *De Gen. ad Litt.*, I, 18. 36 (*PL*, XXXIV, 260).

"Quid enim eorum est, cujus non aeterna et incommutabilis ratio in ipsa Dei Sapientia vigeat . . ." *Ibid.*, III, 12. 18 (col. 287).

". . . una sapientia est, in qua sunt infiniti eidemque indefiniti thesauri rerum intellegibilium, in quibus sunt omnes invisibiles atque incommutabiles rationes rerum etiam visibilium et mutabilium, quae per ipsam factae sunt." *De Civ. Dei*, XI, 10 (*PL*, XLI, 327).

[61]"Omnia haec aliter in Verbo Dei cognoscuntur ab angelis, ubi habent causas rationesque suas, id est secundum quas facta sunt, incommutabiliter permanentes ..". *De Civ. Dei*, XI, 29 (*PL*, XLI, 343).

Cf. also *ibid.*, IX, 22 (col. 274).

[62]". . . fecit hoc incommutabilis et invisibilis ratio sapientiae Dei, per quam facta sunt omnia." *De Trin.*, III, 8. 15 (*PL*, XLII, 876).

[63]". . . in ipsa sua conformatione cognovit, hoc est illustratione veritatis, ad quam conversa formata est." *De Gen. ad Litt.*, II, 7. 16 (*PL*, XXXIV, 269).

Cf. also *De Civ. Dei*, VIII, 1 (*PL*, XLI, 225); *De Gen. ad Litt.*, III, 20. 31 (*PL*, XXXIV, 292); *ibid.*, IV, 22. 39 (col. 312).

[64]"Illa est Veritas quae id implere potuit, et id esse quod est illud; ipsa est quae ostendit sicut est . . . Caetera illius unius similia dici possunt in quantum sunt, in illud tantum enim et vera sunt: haec est autem ipsa ejus similitudo, et ideo Veritas. Ut enim veritate sunt vera, quae vera sunt; ita similitudine similia sunt, quaecumque similia sunt. Ut ergo veritas forma verorum est, ita similitudo forma similium est. Qua propter vera quoniam in tantum vera sunt, in quantum sunt, in tantum autem sunt, in quantum principalis unius similia sunt: ea forma est omnium quae sunt, quae est summa similitudo Principii; et Veritas est, quia sine ulla dissimilitudine est." *De Vera Rel.*, 36. 66 (*PL*, XXXIV, 151-52).

God is at once the Wisdom of God,[65] divine Truth,[66] eternal Light,[67] and the supreme Model according to which all creation is formed.[68]

It may be said in conclusion that St. Augustine's view of the universe was of an intricate but ordered composite of two levels of mutable beings under the providential management of an immutable and omnipotent God.[69] God is unquestionably the central reality around which all revolves and upon which all depends.[70] Everything else shows forth God's perfection; everything else leads to God by steps of increasing immutability; and so the typically Augustinian proof for God's existence is the one that proceeds from sensible things and sensible cognition to intellectual cognition of immutable truth and thus to God.[71] By placing God on a level of his own by virtue of his absolute immutability, St. Augustine at once guaranteed the radical transcendance and unity of God and laid the foundation for

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Cf. also *De Trin.*, IV, 1. 2-3 (*PL*, XLII, 887); *De Lib. Arb.*, II, 17. 45-46 (*PL*, XXXII, 1265).

[65]"... ipsa incommutabilis Sapientia Dei ... quem dicimus unigenitum Dei Filium." *De Civ. Dei*, XI, 9 (*PL*, XLI, 325).

"... cum pronuntiatur in Scripturis, aut enarratur aliquid de sapientia, ... Filium nobis potissimum insinuatur." *De Trin.*, VII, 2. 5 (*PL*, XLII, 938).

[66]"... per ipsam praesentiam immutabilis veritatis, hoc est, Verbum ejus unigenitum ..." *De Civ. Dei*, XI, 29 (*PL*, XLI, 343).

[67]"... jucunditas lucis aeternae, hoc est incommutabilis veritatis atque sapientiae." *De Lib. Arb.*, III, 25. 77 (*PL*, XXXII, 1308).

"... participatione incommutabilis lucis et diei, quod est Verbum Dei ... Lumen quippe verum, quod illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum." *De Civ. Dei*, XI, 9 (*PL*, XLI, 325).

[68]"... ars ipsa per quam facta sunt omnia, hoc est summa et incommutabilis Sapientia Dei ..." *De Lib. Arb.*, III, 15. 42 (*PL*, XXXII, 1292).

Cf. also *De Civ. Dei*, XI, 29 (*PL*, XLI, 343).

[69]"Omnis ergo spiritus, etiam mutabilis, et omne corpus a Deo: et haec est omnis facta natura. Omnis quippe natura aut spiritus aut corpus est. Spiritus incommutabilis Deus est, spiritus mutabilis facta natura est, sed corpore melior; corpus autem spiritus non est ..." *De Nat. Boni*, 1 (*PL*, XLII, 552).

Cf. *De Vera Rel.*, 12. 24-25 (*PL*, XXXIV, 132); *De Gen. ad Litt.*, VIII, 20. 39—26. 48 (*PL*, XXXIV, 388-92).

Cf. also Bourke, *op. cit.*, pp. 112, 118-19, 225.

[70]"... tu es, et Deus es Dominusque omnium quae creasti: et apud te rerum omnium instabilium stant causae; et rerum omnium mutabilium immutabiles manent origines; et omnium irrationalium et temporalium sempiterne vivunt rationes." *Conf.*, I, 6. 9 (*PL*, XXXII, 664).

Cf. *Soliloquia*, I, 1. 4 (*PL*, XXXII, 871); *De Trin.*, III, 8. 15 (*PL*, XLII, 877); *ibid.*, XV, 4. 6 (col. 1061).

[71]"Quaerens enim unde approbarem pulchritudinem corporum, sive coelestium, sive terrestrium; et quid mihi praesto esset integre de mutabilibus judicanti, et dicenti: Hoc ita esse debet, illud non ita: hoc ergo quaerens unde judicarem, cum ita judicarem, inveneram incommutabilem et veram veritatis aeternitatem, supra mentem meam commutabilem. Atque ita gradatim a corporibus ad sentientem per corpus animam; atque inde ad ejus interiorem vim, cui sensus corporis exteriora nuntiaret; et quousque possunt bestiae: atque inde rursus ad ratiocinantem potentiam ad quam refertur judicandum quod sumitur a sensibus corporis. Quae se quoque in me com periens mutabilem, erexit se ad intelligentiam suam; et abduxit cogitationem a consuetudine, subtrahens se contradicentibus turbis phantasmatum, ut inveniret, qu lumine aspergeretur, cum sine ulla dubitatione clamaret incommutabile praeferendum esse mutabili; unde nosset ipsum incommutabile, quod nisi aliquo modo nosset, nullo modo illud mutabili certa praeponeret. Et pervenit ad id quod est, in ictu trepidanti aspectus." *Ibid.*, VII, 17. 23 (*PL*, XXXII, 745).

s deduction of the other divine perfections. In particular he was abled to rebut the Manichaeans by showing the simplicity and irituality of the triune God.

Unapproachable in his unlimited perfection, completely unchang- g and eternal and independent, the God of St. Augustine still takes personal, active role in the evolution of created reality.[72] In this ry fact that St. Augustine's world is a created world, we have the sic reason why he must have a doctrine of providence. Creation mands the constant conservative operation of God in order that it ntinue in existence. Intellectualist that he himself was, and heir to e intellectualistic doctrines of Plato and Plotinus, St. Augustine ways viewed the workings of providence as the manifestations of a iding intellect.[73] That is why so much stress is given to the theory the *rationes aeternae*, those divine ideas according to which created ality is formed. Creation is not for St. Augustine just the external anifestation of immanent divine thought; for he did not follow otinus in making thought the only reality.[74] Still, created beings e unquestionably looked upon by St. Augustine as embodied ideas.[75] is whole teaching about the three levels of *rationes*, corresponding the three levels of immutability,[76] is of the greatest importance in eing how St. Augustine strove to adapt the Platonic cosmology of rmal causes[77] and fit it to the created world of Christian revelation, world that demands efficient causality.[78]

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[72]"Deus itaque summus et verus cum Verbo suo et Spiritu sancto, quae tria unum nt, Deus unus omnipotens, creator et factor omnis animae atque omnis corporis: us sunt participatione felices, quicumque sunt veritate, non vanitate felices: qui it hominem rationale animal ex anima et corpore, qui eum peccantem nec impuni- n esse permisit nec sine misericordia dereliquit; . . . qui non solum coelum et terram, solum angelum et hominem; sed nec exigui et contemptibilis animantis viscera, avis pinnulam, nec herbae flosculum, nec arboris folium sine suarum partium nvenientia, et quadam veluti pace dereliquit: nullo modo est credendus regna minum eorumque dominationes et servitudes a suae providentiae legibus alienas e voluisse." *De Civ. Dei*, V, 11 (*PL*, XLI, 154-55).

[73]See especially passages like *De Vera Rel.*, 12. 24 (*PL*, XXXIV, 132); *De Gen. ad t.*, III, 12. 18 (*PL*, XXXIV, 287); and *De Civ. Dei*, XI, 10. 3 (*PL*, XLI, 326), where gustine speaks of divine Wisdom forming the universe.

[74]". . . non hoc est nobis esse, quod est nosse." *De Trin.*, XV, 15. 24 (*PL*, XLII, 78).

[75]Cf. *De Gen. ad Litt.*, VI, 10. 17 (*PL*, XXXIV, 346), where Augustine describes the ferent levels at which a *ratio* (or idea) can exist. Cf. also *ibid.*, I, 4. 9 (col. 249); 9. 16-17 (col. 252).

'L'univers, tel qu'il le conçoit, est une matière imprégnée d'intelligible par les es divines; tout y est ordre, mesure et nombre, les formes des corps se réduisant à certaines proportions numériques et les opérations de la vie se déroulant, elles ssi, selon les lois intelligibles des nombres." Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de S. gustin*, p. 116.

[76]". . . ratio, qua creatura conditur, prior est in Verbo Dei quam ipsa creatura, quae nditur, sic et ejusdem rationis cognitio prius fit in creatura intellectuali, quae ccato non tenebrata est, ac deinde ipsa conditio creaturae." *De Gen. ad Litt.*, II, 17 (*PL*, XXXIV, 269).

Cf. Bourke, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

[77]Cf. Pegis, "Cosmogony and Knowledge," Part I, *Thought*, XVIII (December, 43), 643-64.

[78]Cf. Gilson, *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, chaps. iv and v, pp. 64-107.

Scripture says of man, "Thou hast made him a little less than th angels";[79] and St. Augustine would add, "less in so far as their re spective functions are concerned, yes; but not essentially less." Man, or at least the chief part of man, his soul, comes just below Go in the Augustinian hierarchy of perfections.[81] Subject to change i time and hence clearly distinguished from the immutable God, th soul does not of itself suffer change with respect to place.[82]

Man's soul is endowed with a participation in the divine unity an order: human reason. This reason is guided and formed by the illu mination given it from the eternal reasons that are above it. By con version and submission to this illuminating influence, the soul is le to a knowledge of all things, a knowledge in accord with the un changing knowledge of God himself.[83] So man attains to truth, t certitude, to wisdom, and to happiness: for man's happiness comes i the contemplation of truth.

Wisdom that has for its object immutable Truth is assuredly man highest knowledge. Science, too, which deals with the sensible world is valuable; but there is always the danger that the attention to th material world will become excessive and destroy the higher exercis of reason. This aversion of human reason from its proper object i what introduces moral evil into the world. The direction of the soul attention either to the eternal Truth or to the changing things o sense is what characterizes the two "cities" into which humanity i divided in the *De Civitate Dei*.[84]

Man, as St. Augustine thought of him, is a dweller in two worlds, sharer in two levels of mutability. Man's soul belongs to the level o those things that do not change in place, whereas his body belongs t the level of those things that do change in time and place. Man is o the border between spirit and matter and is the link between the two As a result, man himself is a good deal of a mystery, a misfit, a sou that is not perfectly at home in its body. The problem of man nature was practically insoluble for St. Augustine because he wa convinced of the mutual exclusiveness of the various levels of in

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[79]Ps. 8:6.

[80]"Animae sunt enim rationales, et illis superioribus officio quidem impares, su natura pares." *De Lib. Arb.*, III, 11. 32 (*PL*, XXXII, 1287).

[81]"Ad illud enim hominis ita loquitur, quod in homine caeteris, quibus homo co stat, est melius, et quo ipse Deus solus est melior." *De Civ. Dei*, XI, 2 (*PL*, XLI, 318 Cf. also *De Gen. ad Litt.*, X, 24. 40 (*PL*, XXXIV, 426); *De Quant. Animae*, 3 78 (*PL*, XXXII, 1078); *De Civ. Dei*, X, 2 (*PL*, XLI, 280).

[82]"Mutari autem animam posse, non quidem localiter, sed tamen temporalite suis affectionibus quisque cognoscit." *De Vera Rel.*, 10. 18 (*PL*, XXXIV, 130).

[83]"Constituamus ergo animo talem sapientem, cujus anima rationalis jam sit pa ticeps incommutabilis aeternaeque veritatis . . ." *De Trin.*, III, 3. 8 (*PL*, XLII, 872 Cf. *ibid.*, XII, 2. 2 (col. 999).

[84]Cf. Dawson, "St. Augustine and His Age," *A Monument to St. Augustine*, p. 7 Bourke, *op. cit.*, pp. 225, 250.

ability and yet was faced with the unity of man that his faith anded. It is not strange, then, that he said that the union of body soul is a mystery.[85]

elow man is the great and varied sensible world. This world of ies is a theater of constant change, and the influence of matter is ywhere in evidence. Yet this world is not entirely bereft of a icipation in the unalterable order of the divine reasons. Bodies, have their reasons, seminal reasons, and their appropriate pro- tion and form and order, which guide their continual changings. ause of these forces of immutability, the world is beautiful and d and shows forth the glory of God who made it.[86]

n the light of this explanation, it seems safe to draw a conclusion o the importance of mutability and immutability in the philo- hic thought of St. Augustine. The contrast between them is damental to his doctrine on God, for it provides him with the ns of ascending to God and of working out the divine perfections e he has reached God. When St. Augustine deals with man, the tability-immutability principle is indispensable in the solution of problems of truth, certitude, wisdom, evil, immortality, and piness. Again, when St. Augustine studies the corporeal world, key problems of change and causality are solved on the basis of opposition of mutable and immutable. Mutability-immutability, n, is the keynote of the world view in the background of all St. gustine's thought. An appreciation of its important role is re- site for a true understanding of his mind. We must remember, vever, that the contrast between mutability and immutability s through the writings of St. Augustine not so much as a philo- hic principle that is consciously employed but rather as a leit- tiv that recalls to his readers' minds those things that were so r to St. Augustine's own thoughts: the spirituality and majesty l beauty of God; the dependence of all mutable things upon that d; and especially the attainment by man of all that means most to , truth, wisdom, virtue, happiness— and all that forever, by the session of Him "in whom there is no change, nor shadow of ration."

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"... iste alius modus, quo corporibus adhaerent spiritus ... omnino mirus est, nec prehendi ab homine potest, et hoc ipse homo est." *De Civ. Dei*, XXI, 10. 1 (*PL*, , 725).

"Habent enim omnia, quamdiu sunt, mensuras, numeros, ordines suos; quae ta merito considerata laudantur, nec sine occulta pro suo genere moderatione hritudinis temporalis, etiam ex alio in aliud transeundo mutantur." *De Gen. ad* , III, 16. 25 (*PL*, XXXIV, 290).

. also the passage from *Confessiones* quoted above in n. 71.

BOOK NOTICES

John Henry Newman, An Exposition and Critical Study His Mind, Thought, and Art. By Charles Frederick Harr Longmans, New York, 1945. Pp. xv + 472. $3.50.

It is especially fitting that this book on Newman should appear in the tennial year of his conversion to the Catholic faith, but it is in no sen mere occasional piece. The author has been studying Newman for thirteen years and spent one uninterrupted year of research in the mate for this book on a Sterling fellowship from Yale. Nor is this the first lished manifestation of Mr. Harrold's genuine interest in Newman. In discerning introduction to *A Newman Treasury,* an anthology of the bes Newman's prose that appeared in 1943, he showed an intelligent and appreciation of Newman the thinker and writer. Besides, there is perh no living scholar who is better acquainted with the religious, social, polit and intellectual milieu in which Newman worked and wrote than Mr. H rold—a fact which he has again demonstrated in his scholarly introduc to the anthology *English Prose of the Victorian Era.* It is from an thority, therefore, on both the Victorian period and more especially on N man that we receive this book. In some respects Mr. Harrold speaks more authority than even Wilfred Ward, Newman's authoritative biograp because he has had access to some sources not available to Ward, and beca viewing Newman's work and ideals from a greater distance, he sometimes them in better perspective. This book is one more example of that objec thorough scholarship applied to things Catholic by a non-Catholic of wh we have had several examples in the last decades. For its objectivity discerning critical analysis it ranks with Karl Young's work on medi drama, with E. K. Rand's *The Founders of the Middle Ages,* and with R. Chamber's scholarly life of Thomas More.

As the subtitle indicates, the book is not a biography, although the section, entitled "Newman and His World," contains all the significant de of Newman's life and development. Of the remaining four sections the sec is perhaps the most interesting and most important contribution to New studies. Under the heading, "Three Great Labors," Mr. Harrold give close, thorough, and revealing analysis and exposition of those works Newman that cluster about these three great problems: 1) the problem the development of religious doctrine, 2) the problem of a liberal educatio an age of science, and 3) the problem of belief in a rationalistic age.

In the two chapters on the problem of development of doctrine Mr. Har manifests a surprisingly clear understanding of what Newman meant development, and has given a better treatment than any other Newman sch has of Newman's precise contribution, in the idea of development, to th logical method. He also shows, more specifically than anyone else has d previously, what Newman owed to his predecessors and contemporaries this idea of development, and traces in detail the growth of the idea in N man's own works that preceded the *Essay on the Development of Doctrin*

In the analysis of Newman's educational ideals Mr. Harrold is, of cou not breaking new land since the ground has been plowed so often bef him; but his knowledge of the period does enable him to throw Newm

of a humanistic training of the intellect into sharpest focus against the arian ideals of contemporary Whigs like Macauley. In the emphasis he puts on Newman's idea of knowledge as its own end, however, and the development of the perfect, natural gentleman as the end-product of university education as such, he fails to point out that Newman also ts that philosophy and theology are the real integrating principles in his of a university education, and that through them Newman envisaged Church using the university to shape not merely the gentleman but the *stian* gentleman.

f the three problems discussed in this second section of the book the one the problem of belief will probably prove most interesting to the phi- pher. Mr. Harrold does not pretend to be an authority in either episte- gy or theology; so he makes no attempt finally to evaluate either the osophy or the theology of the *Grammar of Assent.* What he does try to is to give a clear exposition of what Newman actually says in this work the problem of assent. Because he does see Newman's discussion in the ext of the current problems that evoked it, and because he comes to the k without the prepossessions of Scholastic philosophers who are apt to nsympathetic with a work that is not conceived along Scholastic lines expressed in Scholastic terminology, Mr. Harrold has given the most ligent and intelligible explication of the *Grammar of Assent* that this ewer has yet read. Although he does not presume to evaluate the con- ution of Newman to the field of epistemology himself, Mr. Harrold does rporate the traditional evaluations of philosophers and theologians, which had checked, as he acknowledges in the preface, by the Reverend John F. nin of St. Mary's Seminary, Baltimore, and the Reverend Martin J. Healy the Seminary of the Immaculate Conception, Huntington, New York.

lthough in general Mr. Harrold has shown himself singularly objective well-informed when discussing matters relating to Catholic belief and ma, on pages 179 and following, where he is discussing Newman's *Via dia* and the division which Newman makes among the Roman Catholic, Lutheran, and the Anglican doctrines of justification, he leaves the reader ler the impression that he himself subscribes to the early and mistaken a of Newman that the Catholic believes he is justified by obedience *alone* ile the Anglican believes that he is justified by an internal renewal of grace ough baptism.

We have confined our comments here to what the author says about the hree Great Labors" of Newman, but there is no facet of Newman's thought l expression that is not illuminated by Mr. Harrold's analysis and comment. wman the apologist, the historian, the biographer, the critic, the orator, l the literary artist—all these in turn are subjects of his discussion; and at he says about each is enlightening because it comes from a scholar o has a thorough knowledge of the whole corpus of Newman's writings, l of the social, political, religious, and philosophical context in which it was itten. The book will prove helpful to the student who is just beginning to rk his way through the wealth of Newman's writings and who is still un- niliar with the pivotal points of his thought, and will be of equal assistance the teacher already familiar with Newman who has the pleasant and reward- task of leading other minds to an appreciation of Newman's writings seen their proper nineteenth-century perspective.

M. B. McNamee, S.J.

Louis University

How We Influence One Another: The Psychology of Social Interaction. By Vincent V. Herr, S.J. The Bruce Publishing Co., Milwaukee, 1945. Pp. xiii + 266. $2.25.

The present book adds another title and new laurels to the Science and Culture Series. It seems regrettable that the individual books do not carry listings of the companion volumes in this series, which now embraces so many fields and holds so unique a position among Catholic publications.

Father Herr has performed the work of a trail-blazer and pioneer for Catholic students of social psychology, for the present work is the first attempt at an evaluation, from a Catholic point of view, of this rapidly expanding and much emphasized field of current psychological investigation.

At many points psychology touches on other fields, and one such marginal field is social psychology. To write suitably in it, one should be a sociologist as well as a psychologist, not to say an ethnologist and a philosopher as well. How important the latter role is clearly appears from a reading of the present book. Father Herr's discerning analysis clearly indicates that the weakness in contemporary theories of social psychology lies precisely in their philosophical foundations and implications, which are in many cases demonstrably untenable. A sound philosophy is the remedy and directive supplied by the author in estimating the work in this field. No one will doubt after reading Father Herr's book that social psychology stands greatly in need of such a remedy.

One corrective which Father Herr applies throughout, and which characterizes his treatment more than anything else, is his insistence upon the role which the individual himself plays in the process of his socialization. In the course of establishing this point, the author makes a strong and telling attack upon environmental determinism, the group-mind fallacy, and the doctrine that society confers human nature upon the individual. The central thesis of the book is that "although we are all profoundly influenced by others in ways which we do not always foresee, many kinds of interaction depend entirely upon the deliberately formed and consciously modifiable attitude of the individual" (page 235).

The book contains three appendices, one with questions and problems for discussion, a second with the literature cited in the text, and a third containing an annotated list of textbooks on social psychology in chronological order. The latter is a unique and distinctly a most valuable feature of the book. This would be proof enough, were any needed, of the author's thorough acquaintance with the literature in the field. It appears to the present reviewer that the literature cited is very inconveniently located in an appendix. The suggestion is made—for the book deserves a second edition, and undoubtedly will have it—that these citations would most conveniently be located at the bottom of the page of text, or failing this, at least at the end of each chapter, instead of all together at the end of the book. It is matter for regret that the author has so many secondary references in the literature cited.

The book has been prepared for use as a text in social psychology. This reviewer has asked himself whether it is most suited to the graduate or undergraduate level and has not found the question easy to answer. The inclusion of explanations on very fundamental psychological and statistical method, the selective treatment of topics, the didactic rather than the purely expository style, the frequent reliance on secondary sources, all indicate that the book has been written primarily for undergraduate use. At the same time the book appears to presuppose a considerable acquaintance with the literature in the field, for its most valuable feature is precisely its evaluation of the currently accepted viewpoints in social psychology. These criticisms of contemporary thought presuppose, for their real appreciation, an acquaintance with the works discussed, such as could be looked for only on a graduate level. Were the book, therefore, to be limited to undergraduate use, they would be deprived of it who stand most to benefit from it. It is very likely that the author, while designing his book

narily for undergraduate use, had an eye also upon graduate use. If this is the it will explain why the book will probably not be found to be completely satis- ory as a text for either, but will be extremely useful for both. Even though the ent work is not adopted as an exclusive text for a course in social psychology, no nolic student in the field can afford to be without it, for it supplies him with an uation and an orientation for this field of study which he can find nowhere else.

his book was written for Catholics, and it is doubtful whether its influence will nd much beyond that circle, good and salutary as such an extension of its in- nce would be. It is too philosophical and too dogmatic for the taste of those would stand to profit by it the most.

n social psychology, as in many other fields, Catholics have, as a matter of fact, ributed very little to the scientific development—such as it is—of the field. ers have gone ahead to write the standard and accepted works in the field; and afterwards have Catholics, for the most part, stepped in to point out to them r errors and shortcomings, usually of a theoretical and philosophical nature. We strong where they are weak. We are strong in theoretical evaluation and philo- ical analysis; they are strong in experimentation and in the amassing of data. are right in insisting that unorganized and undigested data are precisely the curse odern science; so that in attempting to supply a sound philosophical basis for ern science we are performing a task of the first importance. This role, important is, is not always appreciated by the scientists themselves, who frequently can n it nothing but a negative, critical, and unsympathetic approach.

holastic authors, by the tone of their writings, have sometimes lent color to such ew. No one who knows of Father Herr's background and studies can doubt that as approached his task with all the sympathetic understanding which could be d. Yet, in the opinion of this reviewer, Father Herr has not everywhere in his succeeded in employing a tone which would win the sympathetic hearing of l psychologists. The following passage, taken from the book, is quoted in this ection:

> At least one system of philosophy, that of St. Thomas, has already worked out these universal laws (of human social nature) from a study of the essentials of human nature all over the world. Do the Gestaltists seek to revalidate these laws or only make them appear more scientific? In fact, revalidation is quite unnecessary, for St. Thomas' analysis of the situation taken as a whole is far more fitting than that of the Gestalt topologists (page 37).

appears to this reviewer that a distinction of some importance may profitably ade here. If we speak of revalidating these universal laws of human social nature e sense of establishing their truth, then truly it may be admitted that such re- lation is unnecessary. But if our concern is rather with the *acceptance* of the n of these laws, then such revalidation may be very valuable. If the laws can tablished on scientific grounds, these men are prepared to accept them, whereas remain quite unimpressed by our philosophic demonstration. It is suggested we might do better to welcome this revalidation, if it can be accomplished, as ndependent verification of age-old truths, rather than to dismiss such an attempt perfluous.

o say that Father Herr has not succeeded in writing a book which is at once a tive for the Catholic student and at the same time calculated to win acceptance wider circle, is merely to say that he has not achieved an ideal which may in ty be unattainable. Perhaps it is too much to ask that any single book do both. ay well be that to write a text which will serve as a guide and directive for the nolic student is one thing; and to write a book, critically evaluative in nature, h will win a sympathetic reading from non-Catholic social psychologists, quite

another. But if the two can be brought together, we may be permitted to hope that it will be Father Herr himself who will do it for us in the second edition of his book.

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THE SOCIAL THOUGHT OF AMERICAN CATHOLICS 1634-1829. By Celestine Joseph Nuesse. The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D. C., 1945. Pp. 315.

Dr. Nuesse's dissertation, submitted to the School of Social Science of the Catholic University of America, is an effort "to discover what Catholics thought [socially] in so far as they left records of value in research" and "what influence the Church and Catholics had upon national life and thought in this period." He states that "no work in church history or in American thought treats of Catholics during this period in the manner here conceived." His definition of social thought in a broad sense is that it includes all thinking about human associations, as well as informal and usually unarticulated assumptions implicit in customs, laws, and social institutions.

The Colonial period is dominated by the Calverts and their followers in Maryland. As is well known, the central feature of this period is the policy of religious liberty which the author states was not necessarily dictated by selfish opportunism, but rather a practical wisdom, uncommon in that age. However, on the material side unconventional thought patterns could hardly be expected, says Dr. Nuesse, for these men held the traditional English views about society. Although the author points out that the original Catholic population of the Colonies included representatives of all social classes (p. 35) his study is solely concerned with the priests, the great planters, and the proprietors. The author concludes that this American Catholicism was a transplantation from England, that the legal and social discriminations against Catholics made them acutely conscious of the need of religious liberty as well as of a complete separation between church and state, and finally that Colonial Catholics were almost wholly conformist in their social attitudes.

In the Revolutionary period the author found no evidence to warrant a claim that Catholics, as such, were "in sympathy from the beginning with the patriotic movement leading to the American Revolution," nor that they interpreted events of the day from either a Scholastic or religious point of view. There were Catholics on both sides in this civil war, but those on the American were there because of their residence, economic position, or country of origin. Yet, the rolls of Revolutionary leaders and of the fighting men contain a respectable proportion of Catholics. Charles Carroll as well as Sam and John Adams, was declaring the necessity for independence long before most of the Colonial leaders faced this issue.

The Catholic leaders of the Constitutional period were generally conservative, as they were identified with the commercial or planter class. In his chapters on the "old church in the new nation" and "the church on the frontier" the author shows that from John Carroll and his fellow bishops on down through the lower clergy and laity the Catholics revealed a national consciousness that influenced their ideas; in the era of Nationalism during and after the War of 1812 they bowed to none in their jingoism.

The author concludes that, partly because of their position as a minority, American Catholics maintained a social outlook best described as conformist. The leading families, with their cosmopolitan and aristocratic views, supported the Revolution as well as the conservative reaction which was responsible for the Federal Constitution and were mostly Federalist-inclined in politics. Middle class nationalism involved the Catholic population in the same manner as the rest of the country. Really more important for real democratic social views and actions were the frontier Catholics, as indicated by such leaders as Father Gabriel Richard of Michigan and Father Demetrius Gallitzin of Pennsylvania.

erhaps because of the nature of the study this book is far more historical than ological; the author could have described the social thought of Catholics in less half the pages used. Frequently much more is said of political than social ght; this is especially true of the sketches of the Federalists. For example, more half the space on Judge William Gaston describes his political views. Certainly Judge's decisions concerning the free Negro and the slave changed the status of e two classes in North Carolina from that declared by previous decisions. The ge's views were influenced by his religion. His social ideas and contributions were thy of more attention in this study than his political views and were more in- ntial in North Carolina than one would be led to suspect from Dr. Nuesse's study. ge Thomas Ruffin and other legal authorities of North Carolina and the nation e influenced by Gaston. There is no attention paid to this point, that is, the in- nce these Catholic leaders had on each other or their Protestant contemporaries. rvey of the Brutè letters in the University of Notre Dame Archives (a luxury no grapher of Brutè has so far permitted himself) would reveal the devoted affection Bishop Brutè for Judge Gaston and the great influence of the Judge upon the op.

lore attention might have been devoted to the question of slavery. Far too little e was given to the frontier districts of Kentucky, Indiana, Illinois, and Louisiana too much space to biographies, as that of Matthew Carey. Judge Francois- ier Martin, mentioned in a footnote, practically single-handed drew up a new l code in Louisiana. Other Catholics of this state surely had some social contri- ons for this period. More notable than the neglect of archival material was that ewspapers; the splendid collection of Catholic papers at Georgetown University ningly should have been more fruitful than it apparently was. Yet this is a start he right direction, even if it be more historical than sociological.

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THE TRACTATUS DE PRAEDESTINATIONE ET DE PRAESCIENTIA DEI DE FUTURIS CONTINGENTIBUS OF WILLIAM OCKHAM. Edited by ilotheus Boehner, O. F. M. Franciscan Institute Publications, 5. Pp. xi + 139. $2.00.

ather Boehner needs no introduction to the student of late medieval philosophy. the past few years several critical editions of individual treatises of William of ham have been edited by Father Boehner. With the exception of a few faults id with words or phrases—diversity of opinion in critical readings is always with the editions have always been commended for their painstaking scholarly re- ch. The present volume is no exception to the high standard of scholarly editing has come to be expected of Father Boehner.

he Tractatus de Praedestinatione et de Praescientia Dei et de Futuris Contingentibus ell done. Under four major headings (I, Introduction; II, Text; III, Problems nected with the Text; IV, Appendix) there are many subdivisions. The Intro- ion describes the seven manuscripts used in editing the present text and dis- es the certain authorship of the work as that of Ockham's. The text itself com- es the second part of the work, in which the usual format of critical editions is owed. The physical makeup is commendable, with easy references, easily dis- ible subdivisions, and clear print.

he third part, which handles problems connected with the treatise, shows clearly Ockham is concerned only with the logical difficulties of the theological problem od's foreknowledge.

he thesis of the *Tractatus* is that predestination or reprobation is not a real relation esenting entities distinct either from God or from the predestined or reprobated on. As a consequence of this, Father Boehner explains the logical problem in-

volved by a definition of terms. The problem is: granting that God's knowledge is omniscient and immutable, is it true that every contingent proposition is either true so that it is not false, or false so that it is not true? As a fact of history, Ockham had some idea of a three-valued logic, which he discovered in, or at least read into, a text of the Aristotelian *Perihermenias*. In *Quaestio Ia, Suppositio Va, O*, Ockham indicates the Aristotelian opinion that in propositions referring to future contingent facts neither part of a contradiction is true or false. Michalski is of the opinion that Ockham accepted this three-valued logic. Contrary to this opinion Father Boehner writes: "If we consider any text of those which we have presented here, the answer is affirmative" that Ockham held only a two-valued logic.

Whether Ockham held the doctrine that Father Boehner attributes to him or whether he did not, does not lessen the value of the discussion. Moreover, Father Boehner gives invaluable extracts from the *Ordinatio* and *Summa Logicae* of Ockham from the *In I Sententiarum* of Aureolus and Gregory of Rimini. These extracts have for their purpose to show that these men interpreted Aristotle as denying that definite truth and falsity are had in propositions about future contingent facts.

As a matter of historical research the present volume must be accepted as a work most useful for enlarging the present-day twilight knowledge of Ockham, and it adds something to the almost neglected figure of Gregory of Rimini.

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THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE FUTURE: POSTULATES, PRINCIPLES AND PROPOSALS. Columbia University Press, New York, 1944. Pp. xxi + 196. $2.00.

In the war years it was common to poke fun at those who found time for postwar planning. Our present social, academic, and international situation would indicate that there was not enough intent and profound consideration of even the obvious postwar situations.

One group, however, which engaged in this task of planning was a group of United States and Canadian students and practitioners of international law. They planned to offer relatively specific proposals by which the international community might be organized to perform its role. These proposals were first made public in the late spring of 1944, thus antedating the analogous Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. They are now available in permanent form.

Rather than limit itself to offering suggestions on the functions and organs of the international community, this group prefaced their twenty-three proposals with a statement and an exposition of six postulates and ten principles of postwar international law.

Those who have studied the Christmas messages of Pope Pius XII and the ideas on international order of the administrative council of the United States hierarchy will find many striking resemblances in both the values expressed and the suggestions urged.

The jurists postulate a natural international community that needs effective international organization. They avoid the common fallacy of stressing collaborative action for pragmatic reasons and urge collaboration for just and peaceful relations. For a time political and academic leaders in international affairs were accustomed to discount or deprecate just and peaceful collaboration as long as there was any collaboration. These jurists, too, begin with the truth that states as well as individuals are subject to higher law, and deny that the only basis for limitations on sovereignty are self-imposed treaty arrangements. Their disapproval of untrammeled (or Austinian) state sovereignty leads to the recognition that violence or failure to carry out one's obligation is the concern of the organized form of the natural international community.

The ten principles are meant to indicate the ideals for which states, which are both erdependent and subject to higher law, must strive in their legal arrangements. ey must watch even their own domestic ideologies lest these effect harm in other tes. They must guarantee to settle their disputes amicably rather than forcibly; co-operate for general international well-being; and to modify, if necessary, their n constitutional arrangements that these may not be pleaded as reasons for lack co-operation or employment of force. Among these legal ideas is that of armament trol, a subject on which Pope Pius XII stated in 1939: "Conclusions of peace ich failed to attribute fundamental importance to disarmament . . . will sooner or er reveal their inconsistency and lack of vitality."

Among the proposals there are concrete suggestions for effecting that peaceful ange for which Pope Pius XII was so eloquent. One of these suggests an authori- tive tribunal to judge whether treaty arrangements may be terminated because a uation motivating the treaty has so substantially changed. In the present stage the international community these declarations of nullity are too frequently ilateral, and, even when the unilateral denunciation is objectively justified, it still akes a nation the judge in its own cause. In the April, 1945, statement of the shops of the United States there was expressed the hope that the task of peaceful eaty change be allotted to a world court. This suggestion appeared open to the sapprehension that a court was being given the task of substituting one public licy for another. Such work, being essentially political, is rather the task for a litical rather than for a judicial organ. When the suggestion of the bishops is ken in the sense proposed by the jurists, it shows a grasp on one of the clearest needs any future system of international law. For international order will not be secure less obnoxious or burdensome treaty arrangements can be declared non-binding some impartial tribunal.

A proposal which shows a parallelism between the views of the bishops of the ited States and the views of the jurists lies in the jurists' proposal for the explicit ention of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. It is not merely *compulsory* arbi- tion for which the U. N. makes no explicit provision; no explicit provision is made instituting or adopting a formal court for this purpose. There is a sense in which may be said that the new Court of International Justice may perform arbitration the request of the interested parties. This point was elaborated in the Graham- cey-Burke pamphlet, *Path To Peace In The Atomic Age.* The jurisdiction *ex aequo bono* permissible to that court in non-legal disputes can be interpreted as permitting ternational arbitration. While that method is less preferable than the proposal of e jurists, it is preferable to the only method otherwise available under the U. N. arter. At least to the present reviewer it appears preferable to advocate arbitration fore the Court of International Justice over non-legal disputes, rather than to rmit this task to go by default to the political judgment of the Security Council th its veto prerogative.

Both the jurists and U. N. Charter go further in restraining technical sovereignty an the United States Senate was willing to go in its recent treaty whereby the ited States agreed to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court of Inter- tional Justice over legal disputes. The Senate agreement requires that only those putes which the United States itself adjudges to be non-domestic are subject to e court's jurisdiction. Surely we approximate more closely to a rule of law and to e juridical institutions advocated by Pope Pius XII when such decisions are made an independent court rather than by one of the interested parties.

Greater power in formulating needed rules of conduct for the international com- nity is vested in the organs suggested in the Proposals. It appears that a combina- n of the Assembly and Council would have direct legislative authority to make se regulations. This is a power now sought for the U. N. Assembly by advocates greater world authority. This reviewer still adheres to the view that, because of e absence at present of a close-knit and positive community of interests among tions, it is more feasible to retain for the present the U. N. method of draft pro-

posals by the Assembly and subsequent ratifications by the member states even though this entails slower progress towards desirable goals.

In one way the proposals of these jurists is a step behind the U. N. structure. In their proposed Council all votes on matters of international peace and security must command a unanimous vote. This is to increase the number of states possessing the veto power and to increase the amplitude of the veto to cover even procedural matters in this area.

The proposals contain many other interesting and useful observations on world organization, but the few that are commented on appear to be representative cross-sections of the jurists' thought. The present reviewer has found these proposals a convenient way of comparing the U. N. provisions with the papal and episcopal pronouncements. Others will find different ways of instituting such comparisons and of pointing out both the excellencies and the deficiencies of the U. N. provisions. What is particularly heartening in the whole work of the jurists is the insistence that the task today is not one of creating an international community, but of organizing it in a way that is both juridical and legal. That they are aware of the need of juridical as well as of legal institutions is seen especially in the postulates which eschew Austinian state sovereignty and recognize higher obligations than treaty-making in maintaining just and peaceful relations between all states.

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KEYSTONES AND THEORIES OF PHILOSOPHY. By Reverend William D. Bruckmann, S.T.L. Benziger, New York, 1946. Pp. viii + 230. $2.50.

This book, which is intended to ease the student's entrance upon the study of "Scholastic" philosophy, contains the following parts: 1) an introductory essay on the nature and content of philosophy; 2) a list of important definitions arranged alphabetically under Latin terms; 3) an alphabetical list of systems and positions briefly explained; 4) a glossary of technical Latin terms; 5) a chronological list of great names in philosophy with a word of comment on each; 6) a chart outlining the content and interrelation of the philosophical sciences. The outline is given in English and in Latin and is contained in an envelope on the inside back cover.

The author seems to presuppose that there is a distinct and single system of philosophy called "Scholasticism." The result is an eclecticism in the worst textbook tradition. Besides, there is an artificial simplification of positions and theories; a tendency to tag and tabulate rather than to produce balanced understanding and insight. Consider for example the comment on Epicurus: "Founder of the School that bears his name. His philosophy was *materialistic* and *anthropocentric*. He taught a *hedonistic* ethics, (*Egoistic Utilitarianism*)" (p. 216: italics mine). It is not surprising therefore that the expositions are far from satisfactory (for example, see "Analogia," pp. 21-23).

The present reviewer would not wish his students to use this book because he fears that it would encourage the learning of philosophy in schematic digests and by memorization of over-simplified formulae. Perhaps philosophy should make a bloody entrance. The confusion and groping, the *aporia*, are necessary; then after long effort under the guidance of a master, the light may, as Plato said, flash forth. The great danger is that the student may, in the very beginning, get the impression that philosophy is a thing of verbal formulae; the necessary tension of the mind may then never be induced.

Perhaps, therefore, in the very nature of the case, a satisfactory book of this kind cannot be written.

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EDIAEVAL STUDIES. VOL. VII. Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1945. Pp. 339. $4.50.

ariety characterizes the seventh volume of the *Mediaeval Studies*. The contents ge from a study on the meaning of "Silva" in Chalcidius's commentary on Plato's *aeus* to an explanatory index of geographic and ethnic names in the *Nibelungen-*. This wide field of interest should make the latest issue of the *Mediaeval Studies* thwhile reading for anyone connected with medieval scholarship.

r. O'Donnell's article on the meaning of "Silva" in Chalcidius's commentary on *Timaeus* should be of interest to the student of the history of philosophy. This cle gives a good evaluation of Chalcidius's historical position and especially of relation to the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions. To anyone interested in the ory of the notion of matter, this article is a valuable and objective study.

nother article that should appeal to philosophers is Fr. Muckle's work on "The trine of Gregory of Nyssa on Man as the Image of God." Students of St. Augus- will find parallels in the teaching of St. Gregory for St. Augustine's doctrine on n as the image of God. The article also contributes to the study of the relation- of body and soul in medieval thought. Finally, St. Gregory of Nyssa's teaching hown as part of the background of the medieval development of a theory of tical theology.

he translation of Avicenna's treatise on love by Emil Fackenheim will no doubt her the study of Avicenna. Already in this same issue of the *Mediaeval Studies* Denomy has made use of the new translation of Avicenna. This he does in point- to the Arabian thinkers as a possible source of the teaching of the troubadours on love.

ther articles appearing in this issue of the *Mediaeval Studies* are: "St. Albert, ron of Cashel," by John Hennig; the second part of Fr. Flahiff's article on the of prohibition in the Thirteenth Century; the text of the first three sections of ert Courson's treatise on penance, edited by Fr. Kennedy; and B. J. Whiting's cle on the translator of *Partonope of Blois*. The volume concludes with a short ly by Professor Gilson on the uses of the Latin expression "multum ad."

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